### 1st Off

#### 1. Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the instrumental adoption of the plan.

#### 2. THE U.S.F.G. is the three branches of government

Dictionary.com 2k6 [[http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united+states+government](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/united%2Bstates%2Bgovernment)]

|  |
| --- |
| noun |
| the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States  |

#### Violation- The aff doesn’t defend the outcome of the aff by the United States Federal Government

#### Ground: it’s the only way to get the link ground to d/as, counterplan competition, they read it, any shift is a skew of strategy

#### Voting issue for fairness

### 2nd Off

#### The language of civil society is masculine, woman cannot participate in the structures of democratic society and the public sphere until the fundamental problem of language is resolved—the k is a gateway issue

Fermon 98

[Nicole Ferman, 1998, Women on the Global Market: Irigaray and the Democratic State, Diacritics, Vol. 28, No. 1, Irigaray and the Political Future of Sexual Difference¶ (Spring, 1998), pp. 120-137¶ uwyo//amp]

Best known for her subtle interrogation of philosophy and psychoanalysis, Luce Irigaray ¶ clearly also conducts a dialogue with the political, proposing that women's erasure from ¶ culture and society invalidates all economies, sexual or political. Because woman has ¶ disappeared both figuratively and literally from society [see Sen, "More Than 100 Million ¶ Women Are Missing"], Irigaray conceives the contemporary ethical project as a recall to ¶ difference rather than equality, to difference between women and men-that is, sexual ¶ difference. She characterizes relations between men and women as market relations in ¶ which women are commodities, objects, but never subjects of exchange, objects to men ¶ but not to themselves: women do not belong to themselves but exist "to keep relationships ¶ among men running smoothly" [TS 192]. Women under these conditions require imagi- ¶ native ways to reconfigure the self, to subvert the melancholy and regression of ¶ masculinist economies and envisage a future in which women would not be ashamed of ¶ the feminine, would experience it as a positivity worth emulating. ¶ Irigaray contends that after the gains of egalitarian politics are carefully examined, ¶ the inclusion of women in the political arena has failed to take into account women's ¶ distinct and different position from men, and from each other, as well as perpetuating the ¶ fiction of the "neutral" citizen, the ahistorical individual citizen of the nation-state. It is ¶ that fiction Irigaray dispels in her critique of liberal democratic politics and its creation, ¶ "citizens who are neuter in regard to familial singularity, its laws, and necessary sexual ¶ difference" [SG 112] in order to benefit the State and its laws. The subject is male; the ¶ citizen is neuter. Who is the female citizen in contemporary society? What is the ethical ¶ elaboration of the contractual relations between women and men, and between sexed ¶ individuals and the community? How do women imagine a distinct set of rights and ¶ responsibilities based on self-definition and autonomy, given the particular strictures of ¶ contemporary politics-that is, the market-driven, antidemocratic nature of the current ¶ economic national and global forces? Irigaray suggests that "the return of women to ¶ collective work, to public places, to social relations, demands linguistic mutations" and ¶ profound transformations, an embodied imagination with force and agency in civil life ¶ [TD 65]. ¶ Irigaray warns that if civil and political participation is construed in overly narrow ¶ terms, if focus is on economic or judicial "circuits" alone, we overlook the symbolic ¶ organization of power-women risk losing "everything without even being acknowl- ¶ edged" [TD 56]. Instead an interval of recognition can expand the political to include the ¶ concerns and activities of real women, lest silence imply consent to sexual neutrality, or ¶ more likely, to women's obliteration under men's interests and concerns. Women's ¶ insistence on self-definition and wage labor, on love and justly remunerated work, ¶ testifies to the obduracy of women's difference, one that is not likely to disappear. The ¶ patriarchal family is still the legal norm, even when certain exceptions are made, while ¶ enduring questions regarding women's health and children's physical welfare as priori- ¶ ties beyond market considerations are consigned to legislative obfuscation, still a political ¶ afterthought. Instead, in the US the liberal state removes the slender welfare net specific ¶ to women and children, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and fails to provide ¶ medical coverage to those who are among the most vulnerable of its citizens. Women ¶ without access to the legal protection of sex-neutral citizenship, poor working women ¶ without language (the money for an effective "mouthpiece" to represent their distress in ¶ a court of law), are further disempowered by liberal politics' insistence on sexual ¶ neutrality-that is, on repression or amnesia regarding the lived experiences of women. ¶ Sexual difference is key to any project of self-definition by women. Irigaray insists ¶ on the sexual nature of this self-definition, not solely for its obvious procreative necessity, ¶ but because the natural world is a source of renewal and fecundity which requires attentive ¶ interrogation and respect [SG 15]. This rebirth seems alien to the structure of male politics, ¶ which instead seem to provoke disasters (Bhopal, Chernobyl, or the current runaway ¶ jungle fires of Indonesia, courtesy of commercial logging, spreading thick pollution to ¶ neighboring countries) and untimely death.' We talk about social justice and forget its ¶ origins in nature and not merely as an engagement between men in abstraction. Irigaray ¶ believes that recognition and respect of difference between the sexes is prior to productive ¶ and generative relations between women, between men, and between men and women. ¶ Sexual difference is universal and allows us to participate in "an immediate natural given, ¶ and it is a real and irreducible component of the universal" [ILTY 47]. It is this prior ¶ recognition of two, rather than the One that has dominated world politics and thought, ¶ which must be acknowledged, along with the possibility of a political economy of ¶ abundance, not only that of man-made scarcity then attributed to nature. This melancholic ¶ (male) script pays romantic tribute to motherhood in the abstract without due recognition ¶ of the relations between real mothers and children, thus failing to properly acknowledge ¶ and protect mother or child. Our ability to address the specifics of race, ethnicity, and ¶ religious and other differences with respect hinges on our ability to acknowledge and ¶ respect the feminine, to see it as a source of invention and possibilities. To do so would ¶ of course affect relations between the sexes, "men and women perhaps... communicat[ing] ¶ for the first time if two different genders are affirmed," it would allow a new configuration ¶ rather than continuing the present regime: "the globalization and universalization of ¶ culture ... ungovernable and beyond our control" [SG 120; ILTY 129].

#### The splitting of the atom is a symptom of man’s persistence in his refusal to reunite with and affirm his body and the female body-only through this affirmation does the destruction of humynkind become unthinkable

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

To forget being is to forget the air, this first fluid given us gratis and free of interest in the mother's blood, given us again when we are born, like a natural profusion that raises a cry of pain: the pain of a being who comes into the world and is abandoned, forced henceforth to live without the immediate assistance of another body. Unmitigated mourning for the intrauterine nest, elemental homesickness that man will seek to assuage through his work as builder of worlds, and notably of the dwelling which seems to form the essence of his maleness: language. In all his creations, all his works, man always seems to neglect thinking of himself as flesh, as one who has received his body as that primary home (that Gestell, as Heidegger would say, when, in "Logos," the seminar on Heraclitus, he recognizes that what metaphysics has not begun to address is the issue of the body) which determines the possibility of his coming into the world and the potential opening of a horizon of thought, of poetry, of celebration, that also includes the god or gods. The fundamental dereliction in our time may be interpreted as our failure to remember or prize the element that is indispensable to life in all its manifestations: from the lowliest plant and animal forms to the highest. Science and technology are reminding men of their careless neglect by forcing them to consider the most frightening question possible, the question of a radical polemic: the destruction of the universe and of the human race through the splitting of the atom and its exploitation to achieve goals that are beyond our capacities as mortals.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s universal silence on the question of sexual difference and reinterpret the 1AC harms through the lens of sexual difference.

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Sexual difference is one of the major philosophical issues, if not the issue, of our age. According to Heidegger, each age has one issue to think through, and one only. Sexual difference is prQbably the issue in our time which could be our "salvation" if we thought it through. But, whether I turn to philosophy, to science, or to religion, I find this underlying issue still cries out in vain for our attention. Think of it as an approach that would allow us to check the many forms that destruction takes in our world, to counteract a nihilism that merely affirms the reversal or the repetitive proliferation of status quo values-whether you call them the consumer society, the circularity of discourse, the more or less cancerous diseases of our age, the unreliability of words, the end of philosophy, religious despair or regression to religiosity, scientis tic or technical imperialism that fails to consider the living subject. Sexual difference would constitute the horizon of worlds more fecund than any known to date-at least in the West-and without reducing fecundity to the reproduction of bodies and flesh. For loving partners this would be a fecundity of birth and regeneration, but also the production of a new age of thought, art, poetry, and language: the creation of a new poetics. Both in theory and in practice, everything resists the discovery and affirmation of such an advent or event. In theory, philosophy wants to be literature or rhetoric, wishing either to break with ontology or to regress to the ontological. Using the same ground and the same framework as "first philosophy," working toward its disintegration but without proposing any other goals that might assure new foundations and new works. In politics, some overtures have been made to the world of women. But these overtures remain partial and local: some concessions have been made by those in power, but no new values have been established. Rarely have these measures been thought through and affirmed by women themselves, who consequently remain at the level of critical demands. Has a worldwide erosion of the gains won in women's struggles occurred because of the failure to lay foundations different from those on which the world of men is constructed? Psychoanalytic theory and therapy, the scenes of sexuality as such, are a long way from having effected their revolution. And with a few exceptions, sexual practice today is often divided between two parallel worlds: the world of men and the world of women. A nontraditional, fecund encounter between the sexes barely exists. It does not voice its demands publicly, except through certain kinds of silence and polemics. A revolution in thought and ethics is needed if the work of sexual difference is to take place. We need to reinterpret everything concerning the relations between the subject and discourse, the subject and the world, the subject and the cosmic,' the microcosmic and the macrocosmic. Everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal or neutral. Despite the fact that man-at least in French-rather than being neutral, is sexed.

### 3rd Off

#### The war powers authority of the President of the United States in the topically-designated areas should be abolished except in the area of targeted killing using robotic aerial vehicles.

#### Al Qaeda is weak now but could recover if the US allows them the opportunity

McLaughlin 13

(John McLaughlin was a CIA officer for 32 years and served as deputy director and acting director from 2000-2004. He currently teaches at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, ¶ 06:00 AM ET¶ Terrorism at a moment of transition7/12, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/12/terrorism-at-a-moment-of-transition/)

A third major trend has to do with the debate underway among terrorists over tactics, targets, and ways to correct past errors.¶ On targets, jihadists are now pulled in many directions. Many experts contend they are less capable of a major attack on the U.S. homeland. But given the steady stream of surprises they’ve sprung – ranging from the 2009 “underwear bomber” to the more recent idea of a surgically implanted explosive – it is hard to believe they’ve given up trying to surprise us with innovations designed to penetrate our defenses.¶ We especially should remain alert that some of the smaller groups could surprise us by pointing an attacker toward the United States, as Pakistan’s Tehrik e Taliban did in preparing Faizal Shazad for his attempted bombing of Times Square in 2010.¶ At the same time, many of the groups are becoming intrigued by the possibility of scoring gains against regional governments that are now struggling to gain or keep their balance – opportunities that did not exist at the time of the 9/11 attacks.¶ Equally important, jihadists are now learning from their mistakes, especially the reasons for their past rejection by populations where they temporarily gained sway.¶ Documents from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, discovered after French forces chased them from Mali, reveal awareness that they were too harsh on local inhabitants, especially women. They also recognized that they need to move more gradually and provide tangible services to populations – a practice that has contributed to the success of Hezbollah in Lebanon.¶ We are now seeing a similar awareness among jihadists in Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. If these “lessons learned” take hold and spread, it will become harder to separate terrorists from populations and root them out.¶ Taken together, these three trends are a cautionary tale for those seeking to gauge the future of the terrorist threat.¶ Al Qaeda today may be weakened, but its wounds are far from fatal. It is at a moment of transition, immersed in circumstances that could sow confusion and division in the movement or, more likely, extend its life and impart new momentum.¶ So if we are ever tempted to lower our guard in debating whether and when this war might end, we should take heed of these trends and of the wisdom J. R. R. Tolkien has Eowyn speak in “Lord of the Rings”: "It needs but one foe to breed a war, not two ..."

#### Drones warfare is key – targeted drone strikes have been effective in addressing terrorism and is best way to address terrorist safe havens

Anderson, 13

Kenneth Anderson, professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, June 2013.

1. When Obama Embraced Drone Warfare¶ How, exactly, did drone warfare and targeted killing become key elements in America’s counterterrorism strategy? And why should we care about them as essential national-security tools for the future?¶ Barack Obama campaigned for his first presidential term on the platform of ending America’s wars. Obama voters and much of the rest of the world figured this promise referred not only to the conventional conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to what liberals considered the long and unnecessary national nightmare of the war on terror. It now seems clear he was misunderstood—though we don’t know yet whether the misunderstanding was by Obama’s design or due to changes that took place after he assumed office. Obama’s policy proved not to be “peace breaks out.” It was, rather, that America would wind down its two counterinsurgency, boots-on-the-ground wars and undertake a refocused effort against the terrorists who had set this all in motion. He framed it this way during the 2008 race. “If Pakistan cannot or will not take out al-Qaeda leadership when we have actionable intelligence about their whereabouts,” he said on the campaign trail, “we will act to protect the American people. There can be no safe haven for al-Qaeda terrorists.” No safe havens—that has been Barack Obama’s strategic lodestar in the war on terror.¶ It is this proposition, more than any other, that gets us to drone warfare.¶ Even as Obama publicly disdained the institutions and methodologies of Bush’s war on terror, he was issuing a new call to arms in that war. Taking the fight directly to the enemy required a means of combat other than counterinsurgency warfare on the ground, and the United States turned to a technology the Israelis had used effectively in their war against Palestinian terrorists: unmanned surveillance drones, now weaponized.¶ This tool had been used during the Bush administration, but sparingly-—largely due to geopolitical fears, but also because it was only by the second Bush term that the CIA had established ground-level human-intelligence networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan sufficient for making independent targeting decisions without having to rely on the questionable and self-interested information coming from Pakistan’s intelligence services.¶ The strategy has worked far better than anyone expected. It is effective, and has rightfully assumed an indispensable place on the list of strategic elements of U.S. counterterrorism-on-offense.¶ But it is not only a strategy of effectiveness, convenience, and necessity. Drone warfare offers ethical advantages as well, allowing for increased discrimination in time, manner, and targeting not available via any other comparable weapon platform. As such, it lends civilians in the path of hostilities vastly greater protection than does any other fighting tool. Drone warfare is an honorable attempt to seek out terrorists and insurgents who hide among civilians.¶ The expansion into automated and robotic military equipment owes much to the ethical impulse to create new technologies of discrimination when fighting enemies for whom unwitting civilian shields were their main materiel of war. Moreover, these are weapons that gain much of their discrimination in use from the fact that U.S. forces are not directly at personal risk and are thus able to take time to choose a moment to attack when civilians might be least at risk. Remoteness—the fact that the drone user is nowhere near the target, as the pilot is probably sitting in an air-conditioned room in Nevada—actually enables precision.

Ethical and effective—and yet today drone warfare is coming under increasingly strong public attack as being neither. Opponents of drones are seeking to raise the political costs of drone warfare to the United States, portraying it as a symbol of an arrogant, reprobate superpower dating back to the days of the “ugly American.” Steve Coll, writing in the New Yorker, says drone use is “unnervingly reminiscent of Eisenhower’s enthusiasm for poisoning schemes and coup plots.” And though, in a recent Gallup poll, two-thirds of those surveyed said they supported drone strikes, there is no question that the political, legal, and moral legitimacy of drone warfare is increasingly at risk. The delegitimators are the international community, both its UN officials and NGO advocates; a sizable portion of academic international lawyers; much of the elite international media; and Obama’s American left.¶ These delegitimators also include a number of conservatives and Republicans, chief among them Kentucky Senator Rand Paul. They claim the core issue is constitutional—that drones violate due process. This argument focuses specifically on the case of a radical cleric and terrorist operative in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki, who inspired a terrorist assault at Fort Hood in 2009, designed an al-Qaeda effort to detonate a plane over Detroit on Christmas Day in the same year, and was deeply involved in a plot to load printer ink cartridges with explosives for detonation on a plane. Awlaki was killed in a targeted drone strike in Yemen in 2011—and he was an American citizen.¶ His citizenship, some argue (most vigorously on the libertarian right), should have prevented the Obama administration from performing the targeted killing. But as an enemy combatant in the war on terror authorized by Congress in 2001, Awlaki could not be granted some special get-out-of-a-drone-strike-free card. Given the inherently unsympathetic nature of the Awlaki example, the due-process arguments of those on the right who stand in opposition to drone strikes took a markedly populist and anti-government turn. When the Republican senator Rand Paul decided to stage a 13-hour filibuster on the question of the legality of drone strikes, he and others spent a great deal of time talking not about the violated rights of a terrorist in Yemen but about the theoretical use of drones on American soil against a suspected domestic terrorist “sitting in a café.”¶ Paul’s critique delighted many conservatives and libertarians. They loved seeing him and others engage the Obama administration in a direct and seemingly high-minded manner, denouncing the “imperial” presidency. But they confused and conflated the Obama administration’s arguably imperial domestic policies with policies on national security, war, and foreign affairs—spheres in which the president has many and capacious constitutional powers. Moreover, those who were thrilled did not give much thought to whether they might see a need for a president they liked better to have access to those same policies—and whether, in making common cause with those who have opposed the war on terror since it began, they are working to destroy one of its most effective tools not only for Obama, but for future residents of the White House.

#### Terrorist retaliation causes nuclear war – draws in Russia and China

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. t may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

### **4th Off**

#### Executive war power primacy now—the plan flips that

Posner 13

[Eric Posner, 9/3/13, Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html]

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President **Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive** in matters of war and peace. **The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever**.

It would have been different if the president had announced that **only Congress can authorize** the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. **That would have been** worthy of notice, **a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress**. **But the president said no such thing**. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.”

Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him.

The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.)

People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

#### Congressional restraints spill over to destabilize all presidential war powers.

Heder ’10

(Adam, J.D., magna cum laude , J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, “THE POWER TO END WAR: THE EXTENT AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER,” St. Mary’s Law Journal Vol. 41 No. 3, <http://www.stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Hederreadytogo.pdf>)

This constitutional silence invokes Justice Rehnquist’s oftquoted language from the landmark “political question” case, Goldwater v. Carter . 121 In Goldwater , a group of senators challenged President Carter’s termination, without Senate approval, of the United States ’ Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. 122 A plurality of the Court held, 123 in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, that this was a nonjusticiable political question. 124 He wrote: “In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, . . . the instant case in my view also ‘must surely be controlled by political standards.’” 125 Notably, Justice Rehnquist relied on the fact that there was no constitutional provision on point. Likewise, there is **no constitutional provision** on whether Congress has the legislative power to **limit, end, or otherwise redefine the scope of a war**. Though Justice Powell argues in Goldwater that the Treaty Clause and Article VI of the Constitution “add support to the view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone,” 126 **the same cannot be said about Congress’s legislative authority** to terminate or **limit a war** in a way that goes beyond its explicitly enumerated powers. There are no such similar provisions that would suggest Congress may decline to exercise its appropriation power but nonetheless legally order the President to cease all military operations. Thus, the case for deference to the political branches on this issue is even greater than it was in the Goldwater context. Finally, the Constitution does not imply any additional powers for Congress to end, limit, or redefine a war. The textual and historical evidence suggests the Framers purposefully **declined to grant Congress such powers**. And as this Article argues, granting Congress this power would be **inconsistent with the general war powers structure of the Constitution.** Such a reading of the Constitution would **unnecessarily empower Congress** and **tilt the scales heavily in its favor**. More over, it **would strip the President of his Commander in Chief authority** to direct the movement of troops at a time **when the Executive’s expertise is needed.** 127 And fears that the President will grow too powerful are unfounded, given the reasons noted above. 128 In short, the Constitution does not impliedly afford Congress any authority to prematurely terminate a war above what it explicitly grants. 129 Declaring these issues nonjusticiable political questions would be the most practical means of balancing the textual and historical demands, the structural demands, and the practical demands that complex modern warfare brings . Adjudicating these matters would only lead the courts to engage in impermissible line drawing — lines that would both confus e the issue and add layers to the text of the Constitution in an area where the Framers themselves declined to give such guidance.

#### That goes nuclear

Li ‘9

[Zheyao, J.D. candidate, Georgetown University Law Center, 2009; B.A., political science and history, Yale University, 2006. This paper is the culmination of work begun in the "Constitutional Interpretation in the Legislative and Executive Branches" seminar, led by Judge Brett Kavanaugh, “War Powers for the Fourth Generation: Constitutional Interpretation in the Age of Asymmetric Warfare,” 7 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 373 2009 WAR POWERS IN THE FOURTH GENERATION OF WARFARE

1. The Emergence of Non-State Actors]

Even as the quantity of nation-states in the world has increased dramatically since the end of World War II, the **institution** of the nation-state has been in decline over the past few decades. Much of this decline is the direct result of the waning of major interstate war, which primarily resulted from the introduction of nuclear weapons.122 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, and their immense capacity for absolute destruction, has ensured that **conventional wars** remain limited in scope and duration. Hence, "both the size of the armed forces and the quantity of weapons at their disposal has declined quite sharply" since 1945.123 At the same time, concurrent with the decline of the nation-state in the second half of the twentieth century, non-state actors have increasingly been willing and able to use force to advance their causes. In contrast to nation-states, who adhere to the Clausewitzian distinction between the ends of policy and the means of war to achieve those ends, non-state actors do not necessarily fight as a mere means of advancing any coherent policy. Rather, they see their fight **as a life-and-death struggle**, wherein the ordinary terminology of war as an instrument of policy breaks down because of this blending of means and ends.124 It is the existential nature of this struggle and the disappearance of the Clausewitzian distinction between war and policy that has given rise to a new generation of warfare. The concept of fourth-generational warfare was first articulated in an influential article in the Marine Corps Gazette in 1989, which has proven highly prescient. In describing what they saw as the modem trend toward a new phase of warfighting, the authors argued that: In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). 125 It is precisely this blurring of peace and war and the demise of traditionally definable battlefields that provides the impetus for the formulation of a new theory of war powers. As evidenced by Part M, supra, the constitutional allocation of war powers, and the Framers' commitment of the war power to two co-equal branches, **was not designed** to cope with the current international system, one that is characterized by the persistent machinations of international terrorist organizations, the rise of multilateral alliances, the emergence of **rogue states**, and the potentially wide proliferation of easily deployable **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction, **nuclear and otherwise.** B. The Framers' World vs. Today's World The Framers crafted the Constitution, and the people ratified it, in a time when everyone understood that the state controlled both the raising of armies and their use. Today, however, the threat of terrorism is bringing an end to the era of the nation-state's legal monopoly on violence, and the kind of war that existed before-based on a clear division between government, armed forces, and the people-is on the decline. 126 As states are caught between their decreasing ability to fight each other due to the existence of nuclear weapons and the increasing threat from non-state actors, it is clear that the Westphalian system of nation-states that informed the Framers' allocation of war powers is no longer the order of the day. 127 As seen in Part III, supra, the rise of the modem nation-state occurred as a result of its military effectiveness and ability to defend its citizens. If nation-states such as the United States are unable to adapt to the changing circumstances of fourth-generational warfare-that is, if they are unable to adequately defend against low-intensity conflict conducted by non-state actors-"**then clearly [the modem state] does not have a future in front of it**.' 128 The challenge in formulating a new theory of war powers for fourthgenerational warfare that remains legally justifiable lies in the difficulty of adapting to changed circumstances while remaining faithful to the constitutional text and the original meaning. 29 To that end, it is crucial to remember that the Framers crafted the Constitution in the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states. The three centuries following the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 witnessed an international system characterized by wars, which, "through the efforts of governments, assumed a more regular, interconnected character."' 130 That period saw the rise of an independent military class and the stabilization of military institutions. Consequently, "warfare became more regular, better organized, and more attuned to the purpose of war-that is, to its political objective."' 1 3' **That era is now over**. Today, the stability of the long-existing Westphalian international order has been greatly eroded in recent years with the advent of international terrorist organizations, which care nothing for the traditional norms of the laws of war. This new global environment exposes the limitations inherent in the interpretational methods of originalism and textualism and necessitates the adoption of a new method of constitutional interpretation. While one must always be aware of the text of the Constitution and the original understanding of that text, that very awareness identifies the extent to which fourth-generational warfare epitomizes a phenomenon unforeseen by the Framers, a problem the constitutional resolution of which must rely on the good judgment of the present generation. 13 Now, to adapt the constitutional warmarking scheme to the new international order characterized by fourth-generational warfare, one must understand the threat it is being adapted to confront. C. The Jihadist Threat The erosion of the Westphalian and Clausewitzian model of warfare and the blurring of the distinction between the means of warfare and the ends of policy, which is one characteristic of fourth-generational warfare, apply to al-Qaeda and other adherents of jihadist ideology who view the United States as an enemy. An excellent analysis of jihadist ideology and its implications for the rest of the world are presented by Professor Mary Habeck. 133 Professor Habeck identifies the centrality of the Qur'an, specifically a particular reading of the Qur'an and hadith (traditions about the life of Muhammad), to the jihadist terrorists. 134 The jihadis believe that the scope of the Qur'an is universal, and "that their interpretation of Islam is also intended for the entire world, which must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully if possible and through violence if not."' 135 Along these lines, the jihadis view the United States and her allies as among the greatest enemies of Islam: they believe "that every element of modern Western liberalism is flawed, wrong, and evil" because the basis of liberalism is secularism. 136 The jihadis emphasize the superiority of Islam to all other religions, and they believe that "God does not want differing belief systems to coexist."' 37 For this reason, jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda "recognize that the West will not submit without a fight and believe in fact that the Christians, Jews, and liberals have united against Islam in a war that will end in the complete destruction of the unbelievers.' 138 Thus, the adherents of this jihadist ideology, be it al-Qaeda or other groups, will continue to target the United States until she is destroyed. Their ideology demands it. 139 To effectively combat terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, it is necessary to understand not only how they think, but also how they operate. Al-Qaeda is a transnational organization capable of simultaneously managing multiple operations all over the world."14 It is both centralized and decentralized: al-Qaeda is centralized in the sense that Osama bin Laden is the unquestioned leader, but it is decentralized in that its operations are carried out locally, by distinct cells."4 AI-Qaeda benefits immensely from this arrangement because it can exercise direct control over high-probability operations, while maintaining a distance from low-probability attacks, only taking the credit for those that succeed. The local terrorist cells benefit by gaining access to al-Qaeda's "worldwide network of assets, people, and expertise."' 42 Post-September 11 events have highlighted al-Qaeda's resilience. Even as the United States and her allies fought back, inflicting heavy casualties on al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and destroying dozens of cells worldwide, "al-Qaeda's networked nature allowed it to absorb the damage and remain a threat." 14 3 This is a far cry from earlier generations of warfare, where the decimation of the enemy's military forces would generally bring an end to the conflict. D. The Need for Rapid Reaction and Expanded Presidential War Power By now it should be clear just how different this conflict against the extremist terrorists is from the type of warfare that occupied the minds of the Framers at the time of the Founding. Rather than maintaining the geographical and political isolation desired by the Framers for the new country, today's United States is an international power targeted by individuals and groups that will not rest until seeing her demise. The Global War on Terrorism is not truly a war within the Framers' eighteenth-century conception of the term, and the normal constitutional provisions regulating the division of war powers between Congress and the President do not apply. Instead, this "war" **is a struggle for survival** and dominance against forces that threaten to destroy the United States and her allies, and the fourth-generational nature of the conflict, highlighted by an indiscernible distinction between wartime and peacetime, necessitates an evolution of America's traditional constitutional warmaking scheme. As first illustrated by the military strategist Colonel John Boyd, constitutional decision-making in the realm of war powers in the fourth generation should consider the implications of the OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act. 44 In the era of fourth-generational warfare, **quick reactions**, proceeding through the OODA Loop rapidly, and disrupting the enemy's OODA loop are the keys to victory. "In order to win," Colonel Boyd suggested, "we should operate at a **faster tempo** or rhythm than our adversaries." 145 In the words of Professor Creveld, "[b]oth organizationally and in terms of the equipment at their disposal, the armed forces of the world will have to adjust themselves to this situation by changing their doctrine, doing away with much of their heavy equipment and becoming more like police."1 46 Unfortunately, the existing constitutional understanding, which diffuses war power between two branches of government, necessarily (by the Framers' design) slows down decision- making. In circumstances where war is undesirable (which is, admittedly, most of the time, especially against other nation-states), the deliberativeness of the existing decision-making process is a positive attribute. In America's current situation, however, in the midst of the conflict with al-Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations, the existing process of constitutional decision-making in warfare may prove a **fatal hindrance** to achieving the initiative **necessary** for victory. As a **slow-acting**, deliberative **body**, Congress does not have the ability to adequately deal with **fast-emerging situations** in fourth-generational warfare. Thus, in order to combat transnational threats such as al-Qaeda, the executive branch **must** have the ability to operate by taking offensive military action even without congressional authorization, because **only the executive branch** is capable of the swift decision-making and action necessary to prevail in fourth-generational conflicts against fourthgenerational opponents.

### 1NC – Case

**Preventing extinction is the highest ethical priority – we should take action to prevent the Other from dying FIRST, only THEN can we consider questions of value to life**

Paul **Wapner**, associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, Winter **2003**, Dissent, online: http://www.dissentmagazine.org/menutest/archives/2003/wi03/wapner.htm

All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one**. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existenc**e. As I have said, postmodernists accept that **there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character**. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But **we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world**-in all its diverse embodiments-**must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters,** in some fashion, **of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity**. In fact, **if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative** and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless**, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the** nonhuman **world**. The nonhuman **is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans** as a species**. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and** the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of **respecting the "other.**" At the very least, respect **must involve ensuring that the "other"** actually **continues to exist.** In our day and age, **this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth'**s diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.

#### Consequentialism is key to ethical decision making, because it ensures beings are treated as equal—any other approach to ethics is arbitrary because it considers one’s preferences as more important than others

Lillehammer, 2011

[Hallvard, Faculty of Philosophy Cambridge University, “Consequentialism and global ethics.” Forthcoming in M. Boylan, Ed., Global Morality and Justice: A Reader, Westview Press, Online, <http://www.phil.cam.ac.uk/teaching_staff/lillehammer/Consequentialism_and_Global_Ethics-1-2.pdf>] /Wyo-MB

Contemporary discussions of consequentialism and global ethics have been marked by a focus on examples such as that of the shallow pond. In this literature, distinctions are drawn and analogies made between different cases about which both the consequentialist and his or her interlocutor are assumed to have a more or less firm view. One assumption in this literature is that progress can be made by making judgements about simple actual or counterfactual examples, and then employing a principle of equity to the effect that like cases be treated alike, in order to work out what to think about more complex actual cases. It is only fair to say that in practice such attempts to rely only on judgements about simple cases have a tendency to produce trenchant stand-offs. It is important to remember, therefore, that for some consequentialists the appeal to simple cases is neither the only, nor the most basic, ground for their criticism of the ethical status quo. For some of the historically most prominent consequentialists the evidential status of judgements about simple cases depends on their derivability from basic ethical principles (plus knowledge of the relevant facts). Thus, in The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick argues that ethical thought is grounded in a small number of self-evident axioms of practical reason. The first of these is that we ought to promote our own good. The second is that the good of any one individual is objectively of no more importance than the good of any other (or, in Sidgwick’s notorious metaphor, no individual’s good is more important ‘from the point of view of the Universe’ than that of any other). The third is that we ought to treat like cases alike. Taken together, Sidgwick takes these axioms to imply a form of consequentialism. We ought to promote our own good. Yet since our own good is objectively no more important than the good of anyone else, we ought to promote the good of others as well. And in order to treat like cases alike, we have to weigh our own good against the good of others impartially, all other things being equal. iv It follows that the rightness of our actions is fixed by what is best for the entire universe of ethically relevant beings. To claim otherwise is to claim for oneself and one’s preferences a special status they do not possess. When understood along these lines, consequentialism is by definition a global ethics: the good of everyone should count for everyone, no matter their identity, location, or personal and social attachments, now or hereafter. v Some version of this view is also accepted by a number of contemporary consequentialists, including Peter Singer, who writes that it is ‘preferable to proceed as Sidgwick did: search for undeniable fundamental axioms, [and] build up a moral theory from them’ (Singer 1974, 517; Singer 1981). For these philosophers the question of our ethical duties to others is not only a matter of our responses to cases like the shallow pond. It is also a matter of whether these responses cohere with an ethics based on first principles. If you are to reject the consequentialist challenge, therefore, you will have to show what is wrong with those principles.

#### threat construction isn’t sufficient to cause wars

Kaufman, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9

(Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence.

A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

#### No risk of endless warfare

**Gray 7**—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, [http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf](http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

#### Scenario planning is good. In a catastrophe-ridden world—it’s vital to make predictions about the future.

Kurasawa, 2004

[Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology at York University, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention

and the Work of Foresight.” 2004, Constellations, Vol. 11, No. 4]

Independently of this room for maneuver and the chances of success. Humanitarian, environmental, and techno-scientific activists have convincingly shown that we cannot afford not to engage in preventive labor. contractualist justification, global civil society actors are putting forth a number of arguments countering temporal myopia on rational grounds. They make the case that no generation, and no part of the world, is immune from catastrophe. Complacency and parochialism are deeply flawed in that even if we earn a temporary reprieve, our children and grandchildren will likely not be so fortunate unless steps are taken today. Similarly, though it might be possible to minimize or contain the risks and harms of actions to faraway places over the short-term, parrying the eventual blowback or spillover effect is improbable. In fact, as I argued in the previous section, all but the smallest and most isolated of crises are rapidly becoming globalized due to the existence of transnational circuits of ideas, images, people, and commodities. Regardless of where they live, our descendants will increasingly be subjected to the impact of environmental degradation, the spread of epidemics, gross North-South socioeconomic inequalities, refugee flows, civil wars, and genocides. What may have previously appeared to be temporally and spatially remote risks are ‘coming home to roost’ in ever faster cycles. In a word, then, procrastination makes little sense for three principal reasons: it exponentially raises the costs of eventual future action; it reduces preventive options; and it erodes their effectiveness. With the foreclosing of long-range alternatives, later generations may be left with a single course of action, namely, that of merely reacting to large-scale emergencies as they arise. We need only think of how it gradually becomes more difficult to control climate change, let alone reverse it, or to halt mass atrocities once they are underway. Preventive foresight is grounded in the opposite logic, whereby the decision to work through perils today greatly enhances both the subsequent Moreover, I would contend that farsighted cosmopolitanism is not as remote or idealistic a prospect as it appears to some, for as Falk writes, “[g]lobal justice between temporal communities, however, actually seems to be increasing, as evidenced by various expressions of greater sensitivity to past injustices and future dangers.”36 Global civil society may well be helping a new generational self-conception take root, according to which we view ourselves as the provisional caretakers of our planetary commons. Out of our sense of responsibility for the well-being of those who will follow us, we come to be more concerned about the here and now.

#### Liberal democracy checking your impact now-

**Dickinson**, associate professor of history – UC Davis, **‘4**

(Edward, Central European History, 37.1)

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. **But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading**, because it obfuscates the **profoundly different** strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively **quite different from totalitarianism.** Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is **functionally incompatible** with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly **narrow limits on coercive policies**, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufé cient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic coné guration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, **totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point** for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. **This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian** (and Peukertian) **theory.** Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stiè ing night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite **radically differing potentials.**91

**Global democracy inevitable**

**Tow 10**—Director of the Future Planet Research Centre (David, Future Society- The Future of Democracy, 26 August 2010, http://www.australia.to/2010/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=4280:future-society-the-future-of-democracy&catid=76:david-tow&Itemid=230)

Democracy, as with all other processes engineered by human civilisation, is evolving at a rapid rate. A number of indicators are pointing to a major leap forward, encompassing a more public participatory form of democratic model and the harnessing of the expert intelligence of the Web. By the middle of the 21st century, such a global version of the democratic process will be largely in place.Democracy has a long evolutionary history. The concept of democracy - the notion that men and women have the right to govern themselves, was practised at around 2,500 BP in Athens. The Athenian polity or political body, granted all citizens the right to be heard and to participate in the major decisions affecting their rights and well-being. The City State demanded services and loyalty from the individual in return. There is evidence however that the role of popular assembly actually arose earlier in some Phoenician cities such as Sidon and Babylon in the ancient assemblies of Syria- Mesopotamia, as an organ of local government and justice. As demonstrated in these early periods, democracy, although imperfect, offered each individual a stake in the nation’s collective decision-making processes. It therefore provided a greater incentive for each individual to cooperate to increase group productivity. Through a more open decision process, improved innovation and consequently additional wealth was generated and distributed more equitably. An increase in overall economic wellbeing in turn generated more possibilities and potential to acquire knowledge, education and employment, coupled with greater individual choice and freedom. According to the Freedom House Report, an independent survey of political and civil liberties around the globe, the world has made great strides towards democracyin the 20th and 21st centuries. In 1900 there were 25 restricted democracies in existence covering an eighth of the world’s population, but none that could be judged as based on universal suffrage. The US and Britain denied voting rights to women and in the case of the US, also to African Americans. But at the end of the 20th century 119 of the world’s 192 nations were declared electoral democracies. In the current century, democracy continues to spread through Africa and Asia andsignificantly also the MiddleEast,withover 130 states invarious stages of democratic evolution.Dictatorships or quasi democratic one party states still exist in Africa, Asia and the middle east with regimes such as China, North Korea, Zimbabwe, Burma, the Sudan, Belarus and Saudi Arabia, seeking to maintain total control over their populations. However two thirds of sub-Saharan countries have staged elections in the past ten years, with coups becoming less common and internal wars gradually waning. African nations are also starting to police human rights in their own region. African Union peacekeepers are now deployed in Darfur and are working with UN peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The evolution of democracy can also be seen in terms of improved human rights. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and several ensuing legal treaties, define political, cultural and economic rights as well as the rights of women, children, ethnic groups and religions. This declaration is intended to create a global safety net of rights applicable to all peoples everywhere, with no exceptions. It also recognises the principle of the subordination of national sovereignty to the universality of human rights; the dignity and worth of human life beyond the jurisdiction of any State. The global spread of democracy isnow alsoirreversibly linked to the new cooperative globalisation model. The EU, despite its growing pains, provides a compelling template; complementing national decisions in the supra-national interest at the commercial, financial, legal, health and research sharing level. The global spread of new technology and knowledge also provides the opportunity for developing countries to gain a quantum leap in material wellbeing; an essential prerequisite for a stable democracy. The current cyber-based advances therefore presage a much more interactive public form of democracy and mark the next phase in its ongoing evolution. Web 2.0’s social networking, blogging, messaging and video services have already significantly changed the way people discuss political issues and exchange ideas beyond national boundaries. In addition a number of popular sites exist as forums to actively harness individual opinions and encourage debate about contentious topics, funnelling them to political processes. These are often coupled to online petitions, allowing the public to deliver requests to Government and receive a committed response. In addition there are a plethora of specialized smart search engines and analytical tools aimed at locating and interpreting information about divisive and complex topics such as global warming and medical stem cell advances. These are increasingly linked to Argumentation frameworks and Game theory, aimed at supporting the logical basis of arguments, negotiation and other structured forms of group decision-making. New logic and statistical tools can also provide inference and evaluation mechanisms to better assess the evidence for a particular hypothesis. By 2030 it is likely that such ‘intelligence-based’ algorithms will be capable of automating the analysis and advice provided to politicians, at a similar level of quality and expertise as that offered by the best human advisers. It might be argued that there is still a need for the role of politicians and leaders in assessing and prioritising such expert advice in the overriding national interest. But a moment’s reflection leads to the opposite conclusion. Politicians have party allegiances and internal obligations that can and do create serious conflicts of interest and skew the best advice. History is replete with such disastrous decisions based on false premises, driven by party political bias and populist fads predicated on flawed knowledge. One needs to look no further in recent times than the patently inadequate evidential basis for the US’s war in Iraq which has cost at least half a million civilian lives and is still unresolved. However there remains a disjunction between the developed west and those developing countries only now recovering from colonisation, the subsequent domination by dictators and fascist regimes and ongoing natural disasters. There is in fact a time gap of several hundred years between the democratic trajectory of the west and east, which these countries are endeavouring to bridge within a generation; often creating serious short-term challenges and cultural dislocations. A very powerful enabler for the spread of democracy as mentioned is the Internet/Web- today’s storehouse of the world’s information and expertise. By increasing the flow of essential intelligence it facilitates transparency, reduces corruption, empowers dissidents and ensures governments are more responsive to their citizen’s needs. Ii is already providing the infrastructure for the emergence of a more democratic society; empowering all people to have direct input into critical decision processes affecting their lives, without the distortion of political intermediaries. By 2040 more democratic outcomes for all populations on the planet will be the norm. Critical and urgent decisions relating to global warming, financial regulation, economic allocation of scarce resources such as food and water, humanitarian rights and refugee migration etc, will to be sifted through community knowledge, resulting in truly representative and equitable global governance. Implementation of the democratic process itself will continue to evolve with new forms of e-voting and governance supervision, which will include the active participation of advocacy groups supported by a consensus of expert knowledge via the Intelligent Web 4.0. Over time democracy as with all other social processes, will evolve to best suit the needs of its human environment. It will emerge as a networked model- a non-hierarchical, resilient protocol, responsive to rapid social change. Such distributed forms of government will involve local communities, operating with the best expert advice from the ground up; the opposite of political party self-interested power and superficial focus-group decision-making, as implemented by many current political systems. These are frequently unresponsive to legitimate minority group needs and can be easily corrupted by powerful lobby groups, such as those employed by the heavy carbon emitters in the global warming debate.

#### Their refusal to defend the consequences of the plan replicates a totalitarian disregard for life – they sacrifice political responsibility on the altar of morality, which turns the case.

Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Summer 2002, Social Research, “Hannah Arendt on human rights and the limits of exposure, or why Noam Chomsky is wrong about the meaning of Kosovo”

What does Arendt mean here? She does not attribute primary responsibility, either causal or moral, for the rise of totalitarianism to these intellectuals, who were basically without power. But she does imply that they were guilty of a serious intellectual and indeed ethical failure, connected to the fact that while brilliant they were also cynical. Disgusted with bourgeois hypocrisy and its double standards, they abandoned standards altogether. Revolted by the impoverishment of social relationships, they abandoned all sense of genuine solidarity with fellow citizens or human beings. It was not simply that they lacked any clear sense of the actual consequences of their rage against liberalism. They also failed to offer, or to stand by, any moral values. They were enemies of hypocrisy rather than partisans of liberty. They lacked any "sense of reality"--any sense of their responsibility for the common world inhabited by men and women, and any sense of the role of their own ideas as potential sources of human good or evil. The theme of the conjunction of intellect and evil recurs again in the concluding sections of Origins, this time in connection not with the irresponsibility of intellectuals as such, but with the relentless logic of totalitarian ideologies. There is, she argues, not simply a dogmatism but a cruelty inherent in the totalistic explanations furnished by such ideologies. Such cruelty derives from the complete independence of totalitarian ideologies from "all experience." Totalitarian thinking reduces all that is unique, novel, or contingent to the simple terms of its own purported truth. All experience becomes reducible to the terms of that truth, and is forced, not simply politically but also intellectually, to conform to these terms. This accounts for what Arendt considers the most terrifying feature of totalitarian thought, its "stringent logicality." Ideological thinking, she argues, "orders facts into an absolutely logical procedure which starts from an axiomatically accepted premise, deducing everything else from it; that is, it proceeds with a consistency that exists nowhere in the realm of reality" (Arendt, 1973: 471). The ideologue, Arendt maintains, demands a consistency that is inconsistent with "the realm of reality." She does not deny that logic is a method of ordering concepts, or that consistency may be an intellectual virtue. But she maintains that such consistency is not and cannot be a defining quality of the world. The world is too complex, too pluralistic, to admit such consistency. It consists of the disparate experiences, beliefs, and convictions of diverse individuals and groups. And it consists of complex situations that admit of difficult and often tragic choices. The demand for consistency in such a world is too monistic. It is an intellectual conceit--and a conceit specific to intellectuals--to imagine that inconsistency or contradiction is the world's most profound problem, and that the resolution of such inconsistency by logical methods is the most important intellectual-cum-political task. For the elimination of inconsistency may well threaten the elimination of situational ambiguities and differences of opinion that are endemic to the human condition. And, more to the point, the world's most profound problem is not inconsistency or ambiguity or even hypocrisy. It is the infliction of harm and suffering on humans by other humans, and the consequent denial of elemental human dignity to the vulnerable and dispossessed. It is, in short, the denial of freedom to human beings. The "stringent logicality" of ideological thinking not only fails to make this suffering a primary concern; it actually exacerbates this suffering, through its own cruel lack of political responsibility, and through its tendency to gravitate toward cruel and unsavory causes that seem noble because of their relentless ideological consistency (see Shklar, 1984). I want to be clear about this. Arendt is talking about totalitarian ideologies, principally Nazism and Stalinism. She is not arguing that all of those who turn "logicality" into a supreme virtue are quasi totalitarians. But in criticizing totalitarian modes of thinking, she also makes a more general point: that "strict logicality," whatever its intellectual merits, can be hostile to other and more important human values. Intellectuals, she believes, are peculiarly liable to ignore this, for they often inhabit an imaginary world of pure ideality, in which ideas, especially their own ideas, predominate. This is the peculiar unworldliness of the intellectual. It is the source of much brilliance. But if intellectuals want to be social critics then they must become worldly, They must appreciate the irreducible complexity and plurality of the world (see Arendt, 1971: 50-54).

#### A limited topic over war powers authority is key to solving the harms of the 1AC – it allows for an engaged public that can expose the hypocrisy of the federal government – only focus on specific policy questions can actualize change by making it relevant to policy-makers – the aff is more likely to cause disengagement and moral quietude than actual change

**Mellor 13**

The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13

**This** section of the paper **considers** more generally **the need for** just war **theorists to engage with policy debate** **about the use of force**, **as** **well as to engage with the** more **fundamental moral and philosophical principles** of the just war tradition. **It draws on** John **Kelsay’s** **conception of just war thinking as being a social practice**,35 **as well as on** Michael **Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society**.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: **[T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force** . . . **citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments** . . . [i**]n the process of giving and asking for** **reasons for going to war**, **those who argue** in just war terms **seek to influence policy** **by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be** both **wise and just.38** He also argues that “**good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation**, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and **throughout the course of the conflict**.”39 **This** is important as it **highlights the need for** just war **scholars to engage** **with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved**. **The question of** **whether a particular** war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular **weapon (like drones**) **can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria**, only **cover a part of the overall justice of the war**. **Without an engagement with the reality of war**, **in** **terms of the policies used** in waging it, **it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms** Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, **as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices**. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war **theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted**.**42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to** **demonstrate** its **hypocrisy** **and to show the gap that exists** between its practice and its values.43 **The tradition** itself **provides a set of** **values and principles and**, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, **constitutes a “language of engagement**” **to spur participation in public and political debate**.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 **These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force**.46 **By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires** recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, **a continuation of policy**. **War**, according to Clausewitz, **is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued**.47 **Engagement and political debate are morally necessary** **as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude**, **which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship**.48 **This engagement must bring** just war **theorists into contact with the policy makers** **and** **will require work that is** accessible and **relevant to policy makers**, **however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power.** **By engaging in detail** **with the policies being pursued** and their concordance or otherwise with **the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language.** **In contrast to the view**, **suggested** by Kenneth **Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate**” **and that “[w]e are** necessarily **committed into the hands of our political leadership**”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. **To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility**. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just **war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use.** **As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant**, **not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power**, **but by forcing policy makers to justify** their **actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy.** **By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language** **for the interpretation of action**, **the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52**

#### Their authors are wrong- Transparency high

Jack Goldsmith, Harvard Law School Professor, focus on national security law, presidential power, cybersecurity, and conflict of laws, Former Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, and Special Counsel to the Department of Defense, Hoover Institution Task Force on National Security and Law, March 2012, Power and Constraint, p. xi-xiii

The problem with the conventional wisdom about the expansion of presidential power is that it tells only half the story. The rest of the story, the one I tell in this book, is a remarkable and unnoticed revolution in wartime presidential accountability that checked and legitimated this growth in presidential power. The U.S. Constitution creates a system of "checks and balances" that gives other institutions—Congress, the courts, and the press—the motives and tools to counteract the President when they think he is too powerful, pursues the wrong policies, or acts illegally. Far from rolling over after 9/11, these institutions pushed back far harder against the Commander in Chief than in any other war in American history. The post-9/11 Congress often seemed feckless, especially in its oversight responsibilities. But it nonetheless managed to alter and regulate presidential tactics on issues—interrogation, detention, surveillance, military commissions, and more—that in previous wars were controlled by the President. Congress was often spurred to action because the American press uncovered and published the executive branch's deepest secrets. It was also moved by federal judges who discarded their traditional reluctance to review presidential military decisions and threw themselves into questioning, invalidating, and supervising a variety of these decisions—decisions that in other wars had been the President's to make. Judicial review of the Commander in Chief's actions often left him without legal authority to act, forcing him to work with Congress to fill the legal void. These traditional forces received crucial support from something new and remarkable: giant distributed networks of lawyers, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them. On the inside, military and national security lawyers devoted their days and many of their nights to ensuring that the Commander in Chief complied with thousands of laws and regulations, and to responding to hundreds of lawsuits challenging presidential wartime action. These lawyers' checks were complemented by independent executive-branch watchdogs, such as inspectors general and ethics monitors, who engaged in accountability-enhancing investigations of the President's military and intelligence activities. These actors were empowered by a culture of independence that had grown up quietly in the previous three decades. And they enforced laws traceable to 1970s congressional reforms of the presidency that most observers assumed were dead but that turned out to be alive and quite fearsome. On the outside, nongovernmental organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights connected up with thousands of like-minded lawyers and activists in the United States and abroad. Together, these forces—often, once again, invoking laws and institutions traceable to decades-old legal reforms—swarmed the government with hundreds of critical reports and lawsuits that challenged every aspect of the President's war powers. They also brought thousands of critical minds to bear on the government's activities, resulting in bestselling books, reports, blog posts, and press tips that shaped the public's view of presidential action and informed congressional responses, lawsuits, and mainstream media reporting. The pages that follow will show that these forces worked together in dynamic ways to uncover, challenge, change, and then effectively approve nearly every element of the Bush counterterrorism program. There are many reasons why Barack Obama continued so much of the Bush program as it stood in January 2009. But the most significant reason was that almost all of this program had been vetted, altered, and blessed—with restrictions, investigators, and auditors, both inside and outside the executive branch, that rendered U.S. fighting forces and intelligence services more transparent than ever, and that enforced legal and political constraints, small and large, against them.

#### Global war does not result from a Western desire for control---it results from lack of clearly defined strategic imperatives---

David Chandler **9**, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster, War Without End(s): Grounding the Discourse of `Global War', Security Dialogue 2009; 40; 243

Western governments appear to portray some of the distinctive characteristics that Schmitt attributed to ‘motorized partisans’, in that the shift from narrowly strategic concepts of security to more abstract concerns reflects the fact that Western states have tended to fight free-floating and non-strategic wars of aggression without real enemies at the same time as professing to have the highest values and the absolute enmity that accompanies these. The government policy documents and critical frameworks of ‘global war’ have been so accepted that it is assumed that it is the strategic interests of Western actors that lie behind the often irrational policy responses, with ‘global war’ thereby being understood as merely the extension of instrumental struggles for control. This perspective seems unable to contemplate the possibility that it is the lack of a strategic desire for control that drives and defines ‘global’ war today. ¶ Very few studies of the ‘war on terror’ start from a study of the Western actors themselves rather than from their declarations of intent with regard to the international sphere itself. This methodological framing inevitably makes assumptions about strategic interactions and grounded interests of domestic or international regulation and control, which are then revealed to explain the proliferation of enemies and the abstract and metaphysical discourse of the ‘war on terror’ (Chandler, 2009a). For its radical critics, the abstract, global discourse merely reveals the global intent of the hegemonizing designs of biopower or neoliberal empire, as critiques of liberal projections of power are ‘scaled up’ from the international to the global.¶ Radical critics working within a broadly Foucauldian problematic have no problem grounding global war in the needs of neoliberal or biopolitical governance or US hegemonic designs. These critics have produced numerous frameworks, which seek to assert that global war is somehow inevitable, based on their view of the needs of late capitalism, late modernity, neoliberalism or biopolitical frameworks of rule or domination. From the declarations of global war and practices of military intervention, rationality, instrumentality and strategic interests are read in a variety of ways (Chandler, 2007). Global war is taken very much on its own terms, with the declarations of Western governments explaining and giving power to radical abstract theories of the global power and regulatory might of the new global order of domination, hegemony or empire¶ The alternative reading of ‘global war’ rendered here seeks to clarify that the declarations of global war are a sign of the lack of political stakes and strategic structuring of the international sphere rather than frameworks for asserting global domination. We increasingly see Western diplomatic and military interventions presented as justified on the basis of value-based declarations, rather than in traditional terms of interest-based outcomes. This was as apparent in the wars of humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo – where there was no clarity of objectives and therefore little possibility of strategic planning in terms of the military intervention or the post-conflict political outcomes – as it is in the ‘war on terror’ campaigns, still ongoing, in Afghanistan and Iraq. ¶ There would appear to be a direct relationship between the lack of strategic clarity shaping and structuring interventions and the lack of political stakes involved in their outcome. In fact, the globalization of security discourses seems to reflect the lack of political stakes rather than the urgency of the security threat or of the intervention. Since the end of the Cold War, the central problematic could well be grasped as one of withdrawal and the emptying of contestation from the international sphere rather than as intervention and the contestation for control. The disengagement of the USA and Russia from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans forms the backdrop to the policy debates about sharing responsibility for stability and the management of failed or failing states (see, for example, Deng et al., 1996). It is the lack of political stakes in the international sphere that has meant that the latter has become more open to ad hoc and arbitrary interventions as states and international institutions use the lack of strategic imperatives to construct their own meaning through intervention. As Zaki Laïdi (1998: 95) explains:¶ war is not waged necessarily to achieve predefined objectives, and it is in waging war that the motivation needed to continue it is found. In these cases – of which there are very many – war is no longer a continuation of politics by other means, as in Clausewitz’s classic model – but sometimes the initial expression of forms of activity or organization in search of meaning. . . . War becomes not the ultimate means to achieve an objective, but the most ‘efficient’ way of finding one. ¶ The lack of political stakes in the international sphere would appear to be the precondition for the globalization of security discourses and the ad hoc and often arbitrary decisions to go to ‘war’. In this sense, global wars reflect the fact that the international sphere has been reduced to little more than a vanity mirror for globalized actors who are freed from strategic necessities and whose concerns are no longer structured in the form of political struggles against ‘real enemies’. The mainstream critical approaches to global wars, with their heavy reliance on recycling the work of Foucault, Schmitt and Agamben, appear to invert this reality, portraying the use of military firepower and the implosion of international law as a product of the high stakes involved in global struggle, rather than the lack of clear contestation involving the strategic accommodation of diverse powers and interests.

#### Public debate won’t change opinions- Americans support drones

Cilliza ‘13

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The ongoing debate between Congress and the White House over its use of drone strikes — a conversation spurred by the leak of an Administration memo detailing broad leeway for unmanned drone strikes to be used against U.S. citizens — will reach fever pitch in the nation’s capital Thursday when John Brennan’s confirmation hearings to be the next CIA Director begin.¶ But, when it comes to drones, the fight in Washington has no parallel in the public at large. Put simply: Americans love drones. A look across the polling landscape on the Obama Administration’s increased reliance on drones suggests that support for the strikes is not only wide but also bipartisan.¶ A February 2012 Washington Post-ABC poll showed that eight in ten Americans (83 percent) approved of the Obama Administrations use of unmanned drones against suspected terrorists overseas — with a whopping 59 percent strongly approving of the practice. Support for the drone attacks was also remarkably bipartisan. Seventy six percent of Republicans and 58 percent of Democrats approved of the policy.¶ In that same poll, respondents were asked whether they supported using drones to target American citizens who are suspected terrorists, the question that stands at the heart of the recent flare-up in Congress over the practice. Two thirds of people in the survey said they approved of doing so.¶ It’s not just Post-ABC polling that suggests the use of drones is widely popular with the American public. A September 2011 Pew poll showed that 69 percent of people said that the increased use of drones was a good thing while just 19 percent said it was a bad thing.¶ The reason drone strikes are popular? Because they are perceived to be effective in reducing the threat of terrorism without endangering American lives. (Polling on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has, for several years now, suggested that a majority of the public believes neither was worth fighting almost certainly due to the losses of American lives.) In a September 2011 Post-ABC poll, three-quarters of the public said drone strikes against suspected terrorists in Yemen and Pakistan had been either ”very” or “somewhat” effective to reduce the threat of terrorism.¶ Now there are all sorts of “to be sure” statements regarding the data above. To be sure, the average American isn’t paying close attention to the issue of drones and how they are being used. To be sure, the debate over what the government can and can’t do as well as how much or little it should be required to tells its citizenry its doing is a worthy one. To be sure, making policy decisions simply based on what the public wants (or thinks it wants) is a dangerous game.¶ But, it’s also important to remember as the drone debate gains steam in Washington that there is little public appetite for an extended look at how unmanned attacks fit into our broader national security policy. Minds are made up on the matter. And, if the public has anything to do with it, drones are here to stay.

#### Plan won’t increase democratic deliberation

CFCIC ‘12

[Center for Civilians in Conflict, Columbia Law School, "THE CIVILIAN IMPACT OF DRONES: UNEXAMINED COSTS, UNANSWERED QUESTIONS", <[http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/The20Civilian20Impact20of20Drones.pdf>//wyo-hdm]](http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/human-rights-institute/files/The20Civilian20Impact20of20Drones.pdf%3E//wyo-hdm%5D%20%2A%2A) In contrast, covert drone strikes have a peculiar kind of public visibility. Media frequently ¶ report on drone strikes, particularly the CIA’s involvement, and debate has escalated among ¶ scholars and human rights advocates; meanwhile, the public largely accepts and supports ¶ the program, despite the informational black hole that surrounds it.380 Accordingly, the public does not exert pressure on the US government to be accountable for potential civilian harm.

#### Democratization doesn’t solve war

Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs – Georgetown University, April ‘11

(Charles A, “Enmity into Amity: How Peace Breaks Out,” <http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/07977.pdf>)

Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is not a necessary condition for stable peace. Although liberal democracies appear to be better equipped to fashion zones of peace due to their readiness to institu­tionalize strategic restraint and their more open societies – an attribute that advantages societal integration and narrative/identity change – regime type is a poor predic­tor of the potential for enemies to become friends. The Concert of Europe was divided between two liberalizing countries (Britain and France) and three absolute monar­chies (Russia, Prussia, and Austria), but nevertheless pre­served peace in Europe for almost four decades. Gen-eral Suharto was a repressive leader at home, but after taking power in 1966 he nonetheless guided Indonesia toward peace with Malaysia and played a leading role in the founding of ASEAN. Brazil and Argentina embarked down the path to peace in 1979 – when both countries were ruled by military juntas. These findings indicate that non-democracies can be reliable partners in peace and make clear that the United States, the EU, and de­mocracies around the world should choose enemies and friends on the basis of other states’ foreign policy behav-ior, not the nature of their domestic institutions.

# 2NC

#### Restricting Obama’s war powers fits perfectly with his presidential narrative of oscillations between hard power and soft rhetoric – it does nothing to rupture the narrative of expansionist masculinity which encodes the American Presidency

Landreau 2011 – John C, Ph.D. from Princeton University. Current Professor at TCNJ in Women’s and Gender Studies. *Obamas My Dad: Mixed Race Suspects, Political Anxiety and the New Imperialism,* The Third Space – a journal in feminist theory & culture, Vol 10. No. 1<http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408>

More than a few scholars have emphasized the democratic and dialogic character of President Barack Obama's rhetoric, especially in contrast to that of his main rivals in the 2008 presidential campaign (Ivie and Giner, Murphy, Rowland and Jones). While this characterization has merit in some areas, Obama's rhetoric is neither dialogic nor democratizing when he speaks about national security. On issues of national security, both during the campaign and after becoming president, Obama favours the standard-issue idiom of militarism and American exceptionalism that has characterized the rhetoric of presidents from both parties since World War II.[[1]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#1) Indeed, his December 2009 decision to escalate military violence in Afghanistan is testimony to the power of the dominant paradigms of national security thinking in his rhetoric and his policies. Bonnie Mann argues that the suasive force of national security common sense in the United States is substantially provided by "the style of national manhood" (180). By style, Mann refers to the "aesthetic" of masculinity that is "[...]carried by stories and images more than by argument or reason" and that functions to orient our sense of what is legitimate, normal and right (and their opposites). The style of national manhood is hinged to broader political styles so that, for example, support for war becomes "[...]an intentional posture lived viscerally, a matter of who we are as a nation rather than a thoughtful commitment to the justice of a cause" (180). In a similar vein, this paper argues that Obama's national security rhetoric is based upon, and oriented by, the logic of American masculinity, and more specifically by the forms of presidential masculinity that are imbricated with national security thinking in our political culture. To make this argument, I begin with an analysis of the apparent differences between the national security rhetoric and policies of George W. Bush and those of Barack Obama. This is important because much of Obama's success in the 2008 electoral campaign was due to his promise of a new beginning in our approach to terrorism and security (Bostdorff). Also, many pundits and critics have praised his rhetoric in this arena in terms of a dramatic contrast between the two presidents, referring to Obama's appeals to soft rather than hard power, and to his performance of a more democratic, less authoritarian leadership style in the global community (Bostdorff, Ivie and Giner, Landreau). My argument swims against this current in that I characterize both Obama's national security policies, and his performance of presidential masculinity, in a line of continuity with Bush. I substantiate this conclusion with a close analysis of three of Obama's speeches. First, I look at Obama's speech in acceptance of the Democratic Nomination in August, 2008. This speech is important because it reveals a great deal about the gravitational force of masculinity in national security rhetoric as Obama shifts his attention from the Democratic primary against a female candidate who was too militaristic for Democratic voters, to the general election campaign against a male candidate with especially strong national security credentials. Then, I turn to the two major speeches in December 2009 in which Obama justifies and explains the aggressive use of U.S. military violence in the Middle East: these are the speech announcing the escalation of the war in Afghanistan at West Point, and the speech in acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize. Obama as the anti-Bush: the Rhetoric of a New Beginning Both during his campaign, and in his presidential inauguration speech, Barack Obama promised a "new beginning" in American foreign and national security policy (especially in relation to the Middle East) that would both keep us safe from enemies and "restore our moral standing" (Obama, Acceptance). In particular, this new beginning promised to distance U.S. foreign policy from the grim (and largely illegal) features of the Bush administration's "war on terror" such as the executive sanctioning of the torture of prisoners, the maintenance of a gulag of foreign detention centres where prisoners could be treated outside the guidelines of U.S. and international law, and illegal secret initiatives such as the program to assassinate Al-Qaeda operatives directed by Vice President Cheney (Mazzetti and Shane). In his first day in the White House, on January 22, 2009, Obama issued three executive orders that followed through on this promise.[[2]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#2) In addition to these early executive orders, in the days and months following his election Obama showed great rhetorical sensitivity to the wide-spread negative perception in the Middle East of U.S. imperial behavior and designs, its uncritical support of Israel, and its disregard for civilian casualties and for the civil rights of prisoners. In an effort to reverse the tide of anti-American feeling, Obama's first post-inaugural interview was given to Hisham Melhem of Al Arabiya TV news (Interview). This was followed in April and May by major addresses in Ankara and Cairo whose primary intended audience was Middle Eastern and, more broadly, Islamic. Both of these speeches articulate a new rhetoric of hope for U.S.-Middle Eastern relations. In the speech to the Turkish parliament, for example, Obama declares: I [...] want to be clear that America's relationship with the Muslim community, the Muslim world, cannot, and will not, just be based upon opposition to terrorism. We seek broader engagement based on mutual interest and mutual respect. We will listen carefully, we will bridge misunderstandings, and we will seek common ground. We will be respectful, even when we do not agree [...]. (para. 38) Hope for a new era of U.S Middle East relations is here embodied by an attitude of respect, by a willingness to negotiate differences and find areas of mutual interest, and by an explicit criticism of the unilateral and monologic focus of the Bush administration on the 'war on terror'. This apparent change in direction in national security and foreign policy seems to be characterized by an alternate version of presidential masculinity and by an alternate telling of the myth of American exceptionalism. Many have commented on the muscular character of George W. Bush's rhetoric of war and national security. Indeed, his policies in what he called the 'war on terror' depended almost exclusively on what Joseph Nye famously called "hard power", and were justified rhetorically by a conspicuously militarist and masculinist narrative about America's role in world history and politics.[[3]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#3) In contrast to the "[...] stern projection of a tough national persona" (Ivie and Giner 288) in Bush's rhetoric and policies, Obama seems to articulate a gentler, more reasoned approach to national security and terrorism that includes the use of 'hard' military power but also depends importantly on 'soft' power in the form of diplomacy, international cooperation, and an emphasis on human rights, economic stability and political freedom. Ivie and Giner argue that the success of Obama's rhetorical appeal to 'soft' power during the 2008 presidential campaign was due to his ability to harness and resignify the deeply-resonant myth of American exceptionalism for a more democratic and community-minded projection of America's role in world affairs. In Obama's version of national security, they write: A less tragic sense of order mandated a reduced sense of guilt and thereby decreased the need for redemption via the cult of killing. This expression of national mission in more democratic and practical terms indicated, at least "logologically," the possibility of aligning public culture with a more global and constructive perspective on matters of national security. It revealed the possibility of a founding myth reformed to relax the lethal grip of the Evil One on the conscience of a nation that might do more good in the world if it were burdened less by tragic guilt.[[4]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#4) (296) This conclusion requires a retrospective reassessment in the light of Obama's decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly dramatic shift from progressive presidential candidate who was proud to have opposed the war in Iraq from the beginning, and who abolished the use of torture and illegal detention in his first day in office, to the president who in December 2009 made the decision to pursue and significantly escalate military violence in Afghanistan? How do we reconcile Obama's seemingly contradictory use of both the soft rhetoric of hope and diplomacy and the hard rhetoric of fear and military violence in his national security statements and speeches? In the analysis that follows I argue that while Obama at times articulates a softer version of foreign policy, and seems to perform a softer, more inclusive presidential masculinity in the area of global politics and terrorism, this does not fundamentally signify a different orientation to national security as some have argued. I emphasize how Obama's rhetoric and policies fall within the standard rhetorical oscillations that constitute the myth of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity, and that those oscillations are principally and most significantly oriented by the more militarist and conventionally masculinist versions of the myth. Obama's speech at the Democratic National Convention in August 2008 marks the formal shift of his campaign focus from Democratic Party voters towards a national audience, and from his rivalry with Hillary Clinton to a campaign against John McCain. In terms of Obama's national security rhetoric, this is a fascinating moment because, in this new broader context, he makes an attitudinal shift to a more militarized and masculinized mode of speech. In fact, Obama's performance of soft masculinity on issues of national security during the primary campaign was an opportune product of the moment that did not reflect the principal orientation of his thinking.[[5]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#5) This is quite clear in the nomination speech as he shifts his campaign towards a more conservative national audience, and directs his attention from a female rival to a male rival with military credentials. Obama's first sentence about foreign policy in the nomination speech concerns his own stature and ability to lead American troops into battle, and to battle John McCain for the position of commander in chief. "If John McCain wants to have a debate about who has the temperament and judgment to serve as the next commander-in-chief, that's a debate I'm ready to have." (para. 79) What is most interesting about this lead-in to the topic of national security, terrorism, and foreign policy is that its main rhetorical function is to emphasize Obama's masculine capability. It does this by declaring his presidential mettle, but also through the performance of an 'I dare you' challenge to his political adversary. It seems to say, 'if you want to fight, then let's fight. Bring it on!' Why does Obama begin this section of the speech with a flexing of muscle? In part, it has to do with the histrionics of presidential campaigns, and in this particular campaign with the anticipated challenge to Obama's military masculinity from John McCain, a candidate with a powerful story of military bravery and heroism to his credit. At the same time, the foregrounding of presidential masculinity in terms of the resolve and capacity to lead the armed forces into battle is nothing unusual. The most significant human protagonist in the narrative of American exceptionalism is almost always the figure of the president. This is especially true in times of danger, crisis or war. He is the commander in chief of the armed forces. To him goes the job of protecting the national family from outside threats and danger. To do this effectively, he must be brave, decisive and rational. He cannot afford to be feminized by being overly emotional or sympathetic to others; he cannot succumb to doubts, or become scared to act (Cohn, Cuordileone, Hopper, Lakoff, Sylvester, Tickner, Young). It is to this mythos that Obama's beginning performance of masculinity in the speech belongs. In the new context of a national audience, it stands out as a deeply-felt and vigorously articulated orientation towards national security. After this initial show of male plumage, Obama continues the foreign policy section of the nomination speech by contrasting his youthful masculinity to McCain's elderly, bumbling masculinity. For -- while Senator McCain was turning his sights to Iraq just days after 9/11, I stood up and opposed this war, knowing that it would distract us from the real threats that we face. When John McCain said we could just muddle through in Afghanistan, I argued for more resources and more troops to finish the fight against the terrorists who actually attacked us on 9/11, and made clear that we must take out Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants if we have them in our sights. (para. 80-81) While McCain turns his sights away from the target, Obama stands up. While McCain muddles, Obama works to finish the fight and "take out" bin Laden if he's "in our sights." In the subtly crafted metaphor of aiming a gun at an enemy that organizes the passage, McCain appears as a distracted old soldier who aims at the wrong target and is generally confused. In contrast, vigorous and youthful, Obama stands up purposely, aims at the target, and fires. These metaphors all work to highlight the differences between McCain and Obama in terms of their embodiment of a properly militarized masculinity: which candidate can stand up, correctly identify the enemy, and fire the necessary shots to kill him. Obama criticizes McCain for standing alone in "stubborn refusal" to recognize the realities of the conflict (that it is with al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, not in Iraq), and therefore for lacking judgment. This lack of judgment is also narrated in terms of a contrast between a youthful and an aging masculinity: "We need a president who can face the threats of the future, not keep grasping at the ideas of the past." (para. 84) Obama declares. The contrast between a man who grasps at the past and one who "faces" the future is coded with messages about age and masculinity: youthful, confident stepping forward into the future versus old, unsteady back-stepping towards the past. At stake in this contrast is which strategy will "defeat" the enemy. "You don't defeat -- you don't defeat a terrorist network that operates in 80 countries by occupying Iraq", (para. 85) Obama argues. These are enemies who must be killed in order to protect the nation. To do this requires a commander-in-chief with masculine resolve and courage who can lead us into battle. This is not work for touchy-feely idealists who want to understand, communicate, and negotiate. And Republicans, Obama points out proudly, are not the only ones with the proper testicular size to lead the army into battle: "We are the party of Roosevelt. We are the party of Kennedy. So don't tell me that Democrats won't defend this country. Don't tell me that Democrats won't keep us safe." (para. 87) As in his opening statement, part of the effectiveness of these lines is their performance of a kind of "I'm up to the challenge masculinity" that talks tough, is aggressive with challengers ("don't tell me"), and does not back down. The rhetoric of American exceptionalism and presidential masculinity foregrounded here in the nomination clearly constitutes the dominant note of continuity in Obama's national security thinking. This is most evident in his two speeches from December 2009 in which he justifies his decision to escalate the war in Afghanistan as the following discussion will show. Obama's December 2009 speech at West Point argues for the strategic necessity and ethical correctness of increased war effort in Afghanistan on the basis of history. The history begins with the 19 Al Qaeda operatives who committed the terrorist atrocities on 9/11 and moves quickly to focus on the Taliban who provided them with a secure base from which to operate. After 9/11, as Obama tells the story, we made great military inroads against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but then mistakenly turned our attention to Iraq. This provided an opening for the Taliban, and for Al Qaeda, who are now coming back into Afghanistan from Pakistan. The Afghan government cannot fight them off and therefore, he says, summing it all up: "In short, the status quo is not sustainable" (para. 12). How does a rudimentary history like this serve as an explanation or justification for war? What is the mediating logic? The over-simplification of contemporary U.S and Afghan history entailed in this schematic narrative is head-spinning.[[6]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#6) But, even putting that aside, if one accepts the history at face value, it is still the case that our commitment to war is left unexplained and unjustified by the narrative. The history begins with 19 terrorists, and ends with the large-scale military action on the part of the United States. Should it not take a lot more than saying, 'well, the Taliban are gaining momentum and, remember, they are best friends with Al Qaeda' to justify the deployment of 100,000 U.S. troops, predator drones strikes all over northern Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan, full involvement of the CIA, major flows of capital and materiel, and huge contracts with private military contractors like XE Services (aka Blackwater)? Obama's historical narrative simply does not add up to a political argument for this kind of war, and for this kind of outlay of capital. As a justification for war, it seems, rather, to be structured like a myth in the sense that Roland Barthes gave the word. Myth, according to Barthes, is paradoxically effective because, formally, it works like an alibi. It is an explanation based on an absence of evidence and meaning rather than its presence. In an alibi (the accused was absent not present at the scene) the meaning and the evidence are always elsewhere (121-127). Obama's narrative amounts to a mythological explanation for war in the sense that its significance lies not in the history itself but in the formal seriousness of a president telling a story to justify war. That is, its significance lies in the rhetorical gesture that serves to remind the audience of the president's authority as commander in chief and of his role to defend the nation from harm. By telling this story the president in effect quotes an array of motives, intentions, plot sequences and characters that are formally full even if their content in this instance is misleading or empty. To paraphrase Hayden White, in this case the content is the form. Here, the details of the story of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan are significant to the extent that they play a role in a larger narrative already familiar to the American audience: the Unites States stands for peace and prosperity, freedom and democracy but sometimes it is attacked by evil enemies whose irrational desire is to destroy all that is good. In that circumstance, the president must protect the national family through the use of military violence. War is the best and, in fact, the only way to make ourselves secure. Following this schematic historical narrative with which he begins the West Point speech, Obama reassures the audience that his final decision to escalate the war was taken only after a serious and difficult deliberative process. This process, he says, "has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less." (para. 13) The image of the president very seriously asking questions, exploring options, and consulting experts is one intended to produce a sense of citizen confidence both in the decision and in the decider (as George W. Bush famously called himself) again without revealing any of the details or particulars that constitute the decision. The rhetorical appeal here is essentially charismatic and depends on thick cultural associations with the president as benevolent paternal authority, and as rational but determined protector of the nation. The tone of the passage is that of a father reassuring his family that the big decision he has made today was made with great care, and with their communal welfare in mind. Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism. As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity. This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[[7]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#7) After the scant historical review, and a summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests." (para. 37).As feminist International Relations scholars have argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of war "abstracted from bodies" (Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly from civilians not soldiers.[[8]](http://www.thirdspace.ca/journal/article/viewArticle/landreau/408#8) As a rhetorical performance, the description of war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn). Obama ends his speech with the conclusion that presidential war speeches commonly have: an eloquent and solemn call to unity and patriotism. "Now, let me be clear: None of this will be easy. The struggle against violent extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world." (para. 41) The logic of a bond between our free society and our leadership in the world is presupposed rather than described or explained. Like all heroes, the hero of the exceptionalist narrative faces a test. In this instance, he is us, and our essential quality of being a free society is linked to our dominance in the world. Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing frontiers of human liberty. For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.Our union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations. We will not claim another nation's resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is different from ours. What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity (para. 47-49). Unlike other world powers, we are benevolent, seeking only that which will make the world a better place. We are, that is to say, a world power but not a world empire. Our history shows this: our military violence and our leadership have underwritten global security for over sixty years. Strangely, though, our fatherly sacrifice to protect the world from harm is sometimes misunderstood, and "we have not always been thanked for our efforts." Who are the unthankful and what is their story? In the standard-issue exceptionalist narrative, they are the enemies of freedom, the sowers of chaos, and the ideologically possessed. Obama certainly believes this. At the same time, the statement that "we have not always been thanked for our efforts" also expresses a deep anxiety about the details and the stories that are erased by the great father's version of history. The Nobel Prize acceptance speech, given just nine days after Obama's announcement of the escalation of the war in Afghanistan, provides a fascinating expansion of the plot of "American as good vs. foreign as evil" that informs the narrative justification for war in the West Point speech. In this speech, Obama contextualizes both American exceptionalism in general, and his specific decision to expand the war in Afghanistan, in a sweeping historical narrative of global progress. "At the dawn of history," Obama declares, "war was routinely pursued between tribes and peoples quite simply as a way of 'seeking power and settling disputes." (para. 6) Later, as "man" progressed, legal and diplomatic efforts were made in an attempt to regulate war and the way it was pursued. Obama invokes just war theory citing it as one of the principle ways in which humans have tried to regulate and civilize war. In Obama's narrative, the United States is located at the upper end of this historical progression because it is the United States that has provided the leadership to produce the global "architecture" of peace in the form of the United Nations, support for human rights, nuclear arms reductions, and so on. Elaborating on the schematic history of the United States that appeared in the West Point speech, Obama says The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so out of enlightened self-interest -- because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity (para. 18). J. Ann Tickner argues that the idea of enlightened self interest corresponds to a masculinist model of international relations in which states are systematic and instrumental they are competitive "profit maximizers that pursue power and autonomy in an anarchic world system

."(52) In this context, if international cooperation exists, it is explained not in terms of community or an interdependent notion of security and welfare, but rather in terms of rational choice and enlightened self-interest. Here, in Obama's version, we shoulder the burden of world peace and prosperity both heroically (with American blood and military power) but also as rational actors. We act not as an imperial power, but as a benign power exercising rational choices in a dangerous world in order to protect our interests. By virtue of the incantatory power of the exceptionalist narrative, our interests are identical with democratic values and the cause of economic justice. The awkward context of the Nobel Prize speech both clarifies and complicates Obama's justification of war. While acknowledging the "moral force" of the theory of non-violence, he also argues that "evil does exist in the world" and that a realist assessment of the world "as it is" sometimes requires violence. This part of the speech is quite subtle, shuttling back and forth between the recognition that war is terrible and the insistence that it is sometimes necessary. The notion that war is sometimes just and sometimes necessary for building peace is modified throughout with an appeal to "responsibility" and to the rational, measured use of military violence. Obama argues that "all responsible nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace." (para. 26) The rationalist tone of responsibility and militaries with clear mandates is matched by Obama's framing of the philosophical question of war and peace as a matter of human imperfection. The ideals of peace are beautiful, but in the world as it is human beings are not perfect. They sometimes act unaccountably and irresponsibly. And sometimes they must be stopped from perpetrating evil. At the end of the speech, Obama signals what for him is the chief human imperfection that is at the root of so much of the world's violence. He says, As the world grows smaller, you might think it would be easier for human beings to recognize how similar we are; to understand that we're all basically seeking the same things; that we all hope for the chance to live out our lives with some measure of happiness and fulfillment for ourselves and our families. And yet somehow, given the dizzying pace of globalization, the cultural leveling of modernity, it perhaps comes as no surprise that people fear the loss of what they cherish in their particular identities -- their race, their tribe, and perhaps most powerfully their religion. In some places, this fear has led to conflict. At times, it even feels like we're moving backwards. We see it in the Middle East, as the conflict between Arabs and Jews seems to harden. We see it in nations that are torn asunder by tribal lines. And most dangerously, we see it in the way that religion is used to justify the murder of innocents by those who have distorted and defiled the great religion of Islam, and who attacked my country from Afghanistan. These extremists are not the first to kill in the name of God; the cruelties of the Crusades are amply recorded. But they remind us that no Holy War can ever be a just war (para. 47-49). In the context of globalization, what jams the machine is fear of loss of identity. This fear also gets in the way of our universal human aspirations for peace and prosperity. The most notable example of this kind of fear is, of course, the terrorism practiced by al Qaeda. This is a fear underwritten by megalomania: the idea that violence is mandated by God. What is striking about this passage is that it plots opposition to globalization as fear of change, almost as a kind of primitive or childish clinging to identity in a world whose universal characteristics are evident. But can this be the whole story? Can one explain the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, as Obama appears to do here, as irrational fear of loss of identity? Is opposition to capitalist globalization American-style, and under the paternal arm of American power, always and everywhere a form of childishness or partial vision? In his concluding comments, Obama quotes Martin Luther King's 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech in which he talks about the moral necessity of striving for what ought to be rather than accepting things as they are. This is an eloquent but highly impertinent frame for the speech. In his Nobel address, King soundly rejects those versions of history organized around notions of necessary violence. Accepting the prize on behalf of the entire civil rights movement, King says: After contemplation, I conclude that this award which I receive on behalf of that movement is a profound recognition that nonviolence is the answer to the crucial political and moral question of our time - the need for man to overcome oppression and violence without resorting to violence and oppression. Civilization and violence are antithetical concepts. Negroes of the United States, following the people of India, have demonstrated that nonviolence is not sterile passivity, but a powerful moral force which makes for social transformation. Sooner or later all the people of the world will have to discover a way to live together in peace, and thereby transform this pending cosmic elegy into a creative psalm of brotherhood. If this is to be achieved, man must evolve for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge, aggression and retaliation. The foundation of such a method is love (para. 4). King clearly rejects the idea that civilization sometimes requires violence, or that violence can sometimes be just or moral. Love, in King's terms, is antithetical to the discourse of innocence, guilt, power and violence that constitutes the narrative of American exceptionalism. Instead, King's ethic of love is consonant with Judith Butler's critique of violence: The violent response is the one that does not ask, and does not seek to know. It wants to shore up what it knows, to expunge what threatens it with not-knowing, what forces it to reconsider the presuppositions of its world, their contingency, their malleability. The nonviolent response lives with its unknowingness about the Other in the face of the Other, since sustaining the bond that the question opens is finally more valuable than knowing in advance what holds us in common, as if we already have all the resources we need to know what defines the human, what its future life might be (35). This is precisely what is wrong with the narrative of American exceptionalism, and with Obama's obligation to it. A story whose plot is organized entirely around the character of its hero does not seek to know. It is narcissistic. It shores up what it knows in fear of the Other, and in this gesture reconfirms that its view of the world is the truth. Obama seems oblivious to the contradictions in his assertion of American power as he struggles here to articulate the oxymoron of peace through war. In the end, what "makes sense" in his justification for war is the cultural and political sense that adheres to the image of embodied presidential masculinity, and to his military leadership performed in patriotic service to America's heroic global mission.

## ROB v. K affs

#### Our role of the ballot is to vote for the team with the best strategy to solve violence and oppression-

#### Sexual difference must come first- the ethical informs the political and this politics refuses the reduction of woman to the male subject

Braidotti 2011

[Braidotti, Rosi. Nomadic Subjects : Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (2nd Edition). New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 2011. p 5.

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This implies the redefinition of the relationship of power to knowledge within feminism: as women of ideas devoted to the elaboration of the theory and practice of sexual difference, we are responsible for the very notions that we enact and empower. Thinking justly— of justness and not only of justice— is a top item in our agenda. This ethical dimension is for me as important as the political imperative. Feminist thinking cannot be purely strategic, i.e., the expression of a political will, it must rather attempt to be adequate as a representation of experience. Feminist theorizing must be adequate conceptually, as well as being suitable politically: one’s relationship to thinking is the prototype of a different relationship to alterity altogether. If we lose sight of this ethical, relational foundation of thinking, that is to say, the bond that certain discourses create among us, we are indeed in danger of homologation and therefore of purely strategic or instrumental kinds of thought. There can be no justice without justness, no political truth without adequation of our words, our ideas, and consequently our thought to the project of redefining female subjectivity in a nonlogocentric mode. As a consequence, the first priority for feminist theory today is to redefine the subject as a gendered unity inextricably connected to the other. For feminism, in the beginning there is alterity, the nonone, a multiplicity. The founding agent is the common corpus of female subjects who posit themselves theoretically and politically as a collective subject. This communal bond comes first— then and only then there arises the question of what political line to enforce. It is the ethical that defines the political and not vice versa: hence the importance of positing the feminist audience as the receptive, active participant in a discursive exchange that aims at changing the very rules of the game. This is the feminist community to which the “she-I” makes herself accountable. The paradox of the ontological basis of desire is that not only is it intersubjective, but it also transcends the subject. Desire also functions as the threshold for a redefinition of a new common plane of experience: “each woman is the woman of all women . . . ” The recognition of a common ground of experience as women mutually engaged in a political task of resistance to “Woman”—the dominant view of female subjectivity— lays the foundation for new images and symbolizations of the feminist subject. If we take as our starting point sexual difference as the positive affirmation of my facticity as a woman, working through the layers of complexity of the signifier “I, woman,” we end up opening a window onto a new genderized bond among different women. Identity politics is, in feminism, a collective project. By genderized collective subjectivity I mean a symbolic dimension proper to women in recognition of the nonreductability of the feminine to the masculine and yet, at the same time, of the indestructible unity of the human as an embodied self structurally linked to the other. It is the complex intersecting of never-ending levels of differing of self from other and self from self. As Adriana Cavarero (1990) put it: what is at stake in this is the representability of a feminine subject as a self-representing entity. It is less a question of founding the subject than of elucidating the categories by which the female feminist subject can be adequately represented. This is an important political gesture because thinking through the fullness of one’s complexity in the force of one’s transcendence is something women have never historically been able to afford. What seems to be at stake in the project of sexual difference, through the extreme sexualization of the subject, is a Nietzschean transmutation of the very value we give to the human and to a universal notion of commonness, of common belonging. I will want to argue that the aim of this transmutation of values is to be able to bring the multilayered structure of the subject to the fore. As Lispector points out: “the life in me does not have my name, “I” is not the owner of the portion of being that constitutes his being. To the extent that “she-I” accepts this, can “she-I” become the woman of all women and be accountable for her humanness? Only this highly defined notion of singularity can allow us to posit a new general sense of being: only situated perspectives can legitimate new general standpoints. In this sense, the experience of utter singularity that G.H. undergoes in her microcosm remains emblematic of the process of women becoming other than the “Woman” they were expected and socialized into being. G.H. shows us paths of transcendence specific to our gender and to women’s own, discontinuous time of becoming.

### Links

#### Women are prisoners of patriarchy – civil society prioritizes masculine politics that leave women in captivity. We find ourselves targeted by an institution far too comfortable with its abuse of power. This violence is not hidden or perpetrated away from the scope of politics, the public sphere actively assumes a neutral political subject, making the female body invisible – His CX answer about what it means to be a good citizen – is based on a flawed assumption of neutrality

Bari 2005 - Farzana Bari is a widely-respected human rights activist and university professor at the Quaid-e-Azam University. Dr. Bari's impressive career includes being the Director, Manager, Women's Rights Activist and Head of the Gender Studies Department at QAU (Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad). Women’s Political Participation: Issues and Challenges,.United Nations Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) Expert Group Meeting Enhancing Participation of Women in Development through an Enabling Environment for Achieving Gender Equality and the Advancement of Women. Bangkok, Thailand, 8-11 November 2005-10-29 <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/egm/enabling-environment2005/docs/EGM-WPD-EE-2005-EP.12%20%20draft%20F.pdf>

Women constitute slightly more than half of the world population. Their contribution to the social and economic development of societies is also more than half as compared to that of men by virtue of their dual roles in the productive and reproductive spheres. Yet their participation in formal political structures and processes, where decisions regarding the use of societal resources generated by both men and women are made, remains insignificant. Presently, women’s representation in legislatures around the world is 15 percent. Despite the pronounced commitment of the international community to gender equality and to the bridging the gender gap in the formal political arena, reinforced by the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform of Action, there are only twelve countries where women hold 33% or more seats in the parliaments (UNDP Report, 2005). This paper attempts to investigate the conceptual and material bases of women’s historic exclusion from the formal arena of politics; analyze strategies adopted around the world to promote women’s political participation/representation; identify internal and external conditions and factors that facilitate or hinder the creation of an enabling environment for women’s political empowerment; and finally draw policy recommendations for the national and international actors. The development context of women’s political participation at the community and national levels will be reviewed for nuanced understanding of the nature of women’s participation and their share in development processes and outcomes. With an increasing recognition among international community of women’s historic exclusion from structures of power, a global commitment has been made to redress gender imbalance in politics. Women’s enhanced participation in governance structures is viewed as the key to redress gender inequalities in societies. The global debate on the promotion of women’s political participation/representation has been surrounded by intrinsic and instrumentalist argument. The former argues for equal participation of women in politics from the human rights perspective. Women constitute half of the world population and therefore, it is only fair that they should have equal participation and representation in world democracies. Instrumentalist argument pushed for women’s greater participation on the essentialist ground that men and women are different. Women have different vision and concepts of politics owning to their sex and their gender roles as mothers. Therefore, it is assumed that women in politics will bring a special caring focus and female values to politics. There is an extensive research literature produced in support of the varied rationale or theoretical approaches to women’s inclusion in politics. However, without debating the merit and demerit of various approaches, this paper is grounded in the broad agreement that proponents of varied approaches have arrived at - women must be included in politics. The challenge facing all advocates of gender equality in politics today is the wide gap between shared values reflected in the national and international policies and practices. Before identifying the key strategies for the promotion of women’s political participation and the vital elements in the enabling environment for women’s political empowerment, we need to strive for a deeper understanding of the structural imperatives of a society in which women’s political participation is instituted. Women’s historic exclusion from political structures and processes is the result of multiple structural, functional and personal factors that vary in different social contexts across countries. However, beyond these specificities of national and local contexts, there is a generic issue in women’s political participation that relates to the wider context of national and international politics, liberal democracy and development. It is, therefore, imperative to critically review these constructs and decode the gendered nature of Democracy as well as Development, which poses limitations on women’s effective political participation. The elements of enabling environment for women’s participation in politics and development cannot be discussed and identified without putting the current development and political paradigms under scrutiny. Development today as Rounaq Jahan (1999) maintains has brought tremendous benefits to people all around the world who have gained in terms of education, health and income. But at the same time development leaves behind 2.5 billion people who live on less than $2 dollars a day. There are glaring disparities among and within countries. Forty percent of world population accounts for 5% of global income while 10% richest account for 54 percent (UNDP, 2005). Presently, the mainstream development paradigms based on capitalist relations of production thrive on opportunities created by gender relations for power and profit (Connell, 1987:104). There is an intrinsic link between women’s domestic labor with capital accumulation. Leacock further elaborate the same point as “ …the inequalities between men and women could not be understood in isolation from polarizing tendencies of the capitalist mode of production which places the ‘peripheral’ countries of the Third World in a relationship of dependency with the metropolitan centers of the First World. Within an egalitarian world order, so called development could not release women from oppressive social, economic and political institutions; it merely defines ‘new conditions of constraints’” (Leacock, 1977:320). It is imperative for gender equality advocates to focus on the gendered nature of development and challenge the capitalist paradigm of international development that creates and recreates gender disparities, while at the same time working towards creating an enabling environment for women’s participation in development. Women’s mere participation in mainstream development cannot automatically lead to their advancement and gender equality unless the contradiction in the development claim for equality and justice and the practice is eliminated. The level and nature of participation is equally important to determine whether women are able to share development gains. Another contextual issue in women’s political participation relates to the nature of politics in general and the liberal democracy in particular. Democracy has historically served men better than women. As a political system from the ancient Greece to the modern times of the 21st century, it has built on the public-private dichotomy and excluded women from citizenship. Women have been kept outside the public domain of politics as most of the political thinkers and philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, John Lock, Thomas Hobbes and Hegel considered women fit only for domestic roles in the private sphere and maintained that there was no place for women in politics because of their suitability in caring roles as mothers and wives. The public private divide remains as the foundation of the various forms of world democracies (Phillips, 1998, Rai, 2000). This is one of the reasons that the normative political theory considered private sphere as non-political and did not make any effort to explore the political nature of the private life. The ancient and modern democracies failed to recognize women as citizens. Therefore, they sidelined them and their concerns in its theory and practice (Bathla, 1998:39). It was only the liberal political philosophy of the 19th century that promoted the idea of ‘free and rational’ individual which was used by suffragists to demand for the right for vote. However, as Rai maintains the conceptual basis of liberal theory is inherently gendered in ways, which perpetuates patterns of patriarchy and ignores gender subordination in both polity and society (Rai 2000:2). Feminist theorists also challenged the notion of abstract individual in liberal theory and argued it is not a gender-neutral category. This is why despite women had the right to vote they were not able to impact public policy and could not bring private sphere in the preview of the public. Even western democracies left them dislocated on many fronts. When women enter politics within this patriarchal context of modern democracies, they are unable to play a role to radically change the sexual politics rather they largely play political roles on male’s terms. The fundamental assumption in liberal democracies needs to be changed in order to create genuine political space for women within.

### AT: Perm F/L

#### First, Oppression D/A-The permutation is not an act of love-it rejects woman’s attempt to stand outside of the masculine universal, undifferentiated, and demands her oppression

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

One configuration remains in latency, in abeyance: that of love among women. A configuration that constitutes a substrate that is sometimes mute, sometimes a disturbing force in our culture. A very live substrate whose outlines, shapes, are yet blurred, chaotic, or confused. Traditionally, therefore, this love among women has been a matter of rivalry with: - the real mother, - an all-powerful prototype of maternity, - the desire of man: of father, son, brother. This involves quantitative estimates of love that ceaselessly interrupt love's attraction and development. When we hear women talking to each other, we tend to hear expressions like the following: -like you; - me too; - me more (or me less). Such nagging calculations (which may be unconscious or preconscious) paralyze the fluidity of affect. We harden, borrow, situate ourselves on the edges of the other in order to "exist." As proofs of love, these comparatives eliminate the possibility of a place among women. We prize one another by standards that are not our own and which occupy, without inhabiting, the potential place of our identity. These statements bear witness to affects which are still childish or which fail to survive the death struggle of a narcissism that is always put off: to infinity or else to the hands of a third party as judge. One of the remarks you often hear one woman say to another woman who is a little better situated in her identity is: just like everyone else. Here we have no proof of love, but a judgmental statement that prevents the woman from standing out from an undifferentiated grouping, from a sort of primitive community of women, unconscious utopias or atopias that some women exploit at times to prevent one of their number from affirming her identity. Without realizing it, or willing it, in most cases, women constitute the most terrible instrument of their own oppression: they destroy anything that emerges from their undifferentiated condition and thus become agents of their own annihilation, their reduction to a sameness that is not their own. A kind of magma, of "night in which all the cats are gray," from which man, or humanity, extracts for free what he needs for food, lodging, and survival. These like you J me too J me more (or less) J just like everyone else kinds of remarks have little to do with a loving ethics. They are trace-symptoms of the polemos7 among women. There is no with you in this economy. But there may be a fusional state out of which nothing emerges or should emerge, or else a blind competition to occupy a place or space that is ill-defined but which arouses attraction, envy, passion. It is still not another woman who is loved but merely the place she occupies, that she creates, and that must be taken away from her, rather than respected. This tends to be the way with passions among women. We have to move against the current of history for things to be any different. Which does happen. And constitutes one of the most essential places for an ethics of the passions: no love oj other without love oj same.

#### Second, As woman announced the Pentecost woman must share equally in the divine- the permutation is an attempt at assimilation that denies equal partnership

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

The spirit is not to be imprisoned only in the Father-son duality. The spirit eludes this "couple." This event is announced in the Gospel itself: the female, the women partake not in the Last Supper but in the Pentecost, and it is they who discover and announce the resurrection. This seems to say that the body of man can return to life when woman no longer forgets that she has a share in the spirit. In·this way her transfiguration would take place. The moment of her glorification, finally without masochism. Without the infliction of wounds. Without the need for her body to be opened over and again to pleasure, to jouissance, or to conception. The body would be enveloped in her flesh. Inside-outside. Even for conception, the cradle would in some sense be ready. The nest for the child would be possible if the female had its own nest. If woman had her own territory: her birth, her genesis, her growth. With the female becoming in self and for self as Hegel would say. An in self and a for self that are not closed off in the self-sufficiency of a consciousness or a mind. An in self and a for self that always also remain for the other and in a world and a universe that are partway open. For woman to affirm that her desire proceeds or wills thus, woman must be born into desire. She must be longed for, loved, valued as a daughter. An other morning, a new parousia that necessarily accompanies the coming of an ethical God. He respects the difference between him and her, in cosmic and aesthetic generation and creation. Sharing the heaven and the earth in all their elements, potencies, acts.

#### Third, Incrementalism D/A-doesn’t solve-language and subjectivity is fundamentally disparately sexuate- a radical affirmation of difference is a prerequisite

Irigaray 85

[Luce Irigaray, 1985, “An Ethics of Sexual Difference”, uwyo//amp]

Up to this point, my reading and my interpretation of the history of philosophy agree with Merleau-Ponty: we must go back to a moment of prediscursive experience, recommence ev~ rything, all the categories by which we understand things, the world, subject-object divisions, recommence everything and pause at the "mystery, as familiar as it is unexplained, of a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity. ""If we could rediscover within the exercise of seeing and speaking some of the living references that assign themselves such a destiny in a language, perhaps they would teach us how to form our new instruments, and first of all to understand our research, our interrogation themselves." (P. 130). This operation is absolutely necessary in order to bring the maternal-feminine into language: at the level of theme, motif, subject, articulation, syntax, and so on. Which requires passage through the night, a light that remains in obscurity.

# 1NR

#### Pres can self-bind

Posner and Vermeule 2010 [Eric A. , Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law School and Editor of The Journal of Legal Studies; Adrian , Harvard Law Professor, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford Press, p. 138-139//wyo-sc]

Many of our mechanisms are unproblematic from a legal perspective, as they involve presidential actions that are clearly lawful. But a few raise legal questions; in particular, those that involve self-binding.59 Can a president bind himself to respect particular first-order policies? With qualifications, the answer is "yes, at least to the same extent that a legislature can." Formally, a duly promulgated executive rule or order binds even the executive unless and until it is validly abrogated, thereby establishing a new legal status quo.60 The legal authority to establish a new status quo allows a president to create inertia or political constraints that will affect his own future choices. In a practical sense, presidents, like legislatures, have great de facto power to adopt policies that shape the legal landscape for the future. A president might commit himself to a long-term project of defense procurement or infrastructure or foreign policy, narrowing his own future choices and generating new political coalitions that will act to defend the new rules or policies. More schematically, we may speak of formal and informal means of selfbinding: 1. The president might use formal means to bind himself. This is possible in the sense that an executive order, if otherwise valid, legally binds the president while it is in effect and may be enforced by the courts. It is not possible in the sense that the president can always repeal the executive order if he can bear the political and reputational costs of doing so. 2. The president might use informal means to bind himself. This is not only possible but frequent and important. Issuing an executive rule providing for the appointment of special prosecutors, as Nixon did, is not a formal self-binding.61 However, there may be political costs to repealing the order. This effect does not depend on the courts' willingness to enforce the order, even against Nixon himself. Court enforcement makes the order legally binding while it is in place, but only political and reputational enforcement can protect it from repeal. Just as a dessert addict might announce to his friends that he is going on a no-dessert diet in order to raise the reputational costs of backsliding and thus commit himself, so too the repeal of an executive order may be seen as a breach of faith even if no other institution ever enforces it. In what follows, we will invoke both formal and informal mechanisms. For our purposes, the distinction between the authority to engage in de jure self-binding (legally limited and well-defined) and the power to engage in de facto self-binding (broad and amorphous) is secondary. So long as policies are deliberately chosen with a view to generating credibility, and do so by constraining the president’s own future choices in ways that impose greater costs on ill-motivated presidents than on well-motivated ones, it does not matter whether the constraint is formal or informal.

#### And, Al Qaeda fast tracked

Ciluffo 11

(Frank, Director of the George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, "After bin Laden the Threat Remains: Drones, CIA, and SOF Still the Only Game in Town," HSPI Commentary 22, May 2, [www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary022\_after\_bin\_laden.cfm](http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/commentary022_after_bin_laden.cfm))

Would-be successors to bin Laden wait (and likely not for long) in the wings. Ayman al Zawahiri, Ilyas Kashmiri, Anwar al Awlaki, and others continue to pose a grave threat to the United States. We should expect them to fast-track any and all plots that have the chance to produce high-visibility mass-casualty attacks against US targets overseas or on the homeland. Zawahiri, Kashmiri, Awlaki and others (known and perhaps unknown) will be motivated to prove they are relevant, that they can continue to pose a threat, and most of all that they deserve to be the heir apparent to bin Laden. It is this last potential outcome, an internal power struggle, that might spawn the greatest uptick in the terror threat.

#### War turns oppression

Goldstein 01

IR professor at American University (Joshua, War and Gender, p. 412, Google Books)

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. **Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.”** Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war, one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps. among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that **causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices**.9 So, “if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. **Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too**. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, **the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate**.

#### Resolve to fight is key to an effective and limited campaign

**Brook and Ghate 2005**

(Yaron, Exec Director of the Ayn Rand Institute, Onkar, Ph.D in Philosophy and Senior Fellow at ARI, “The Foreign Policy of Guilt,” August 1, <http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=11269>)

Support for totalitarian Islam will wither only when the Islamic world is convinced that the West will fight--and fight aggressively. As long as the insurgents continue with their brutal acts in Iraq, unharmed by the mightiest military force in human history, as long as the citizens of London return to "normal" lives with subways exploding all around them, as long as the West continues to negotiate with Iran on nuclear weapons--as long as the West continues to appease its enemies, because it believes it has no moral right to destroy them, totalitarian Islam is emboldened. It is the West's moral weakness that feeds terrorism and brings it fresh recruits. It is the prospect of success against the West, fueled by the West's apologetic response, that allows totalitarian Islam to thrive. Bush has said repeatedly, in unguarded moments, that this war is un-winnable. By his foreign policy, it is. But if the British and American people gain the self-esteem to assert our moral right to exist--with everything this entails--victory will be ours.

#### Yes, the war on terror will go on for a long time – this isn’t a reason to give up and will be true regardless of our strategy

**Peters, 2002**

Ralph, retired Army officer and the author of 19 books, as well as of hundreds of essays and articles, experience, military or civilian, in 60 countries, and is a frequent contributor to Parameters, Parameters, Autumn 2002, “[Rolling Back Radical Islam”](http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1015395/posts%22%20%5Ct%20%22_self)”

Driven by the ferocity of events, we have begun to react militarily to the violence in Islam’s borderlands, from the Caucasus to the Philippines, as well as in that eternal frontier state, Afghanistan. And much more military engagement will be necessary in the future. But our military can address only the problems of the moment, problems rooted in yesterday. We must begin to examine the dilemmas and opportunities of each new day with greater interest, so that we may help (to the degree we can) struggling societies discover paths to a more peaceful, cooperative tomorrow. Whatever we do or fail to do, our military will be busy throughout the lifetimes of anyone reading these freshly printed lines. Success will never be final, but always a matter of degree—though, sometimes, of high degree: the difference between a bloody contest of civilizations and the routine ebb and flow of lesser conflicts. Our lack of involvement—indeed, our lack of interest—in Islam’s efforts to define its character for the 21st century and beyond has abandoned the field to our mortal enemies. Over the past few decades, Middle Eastern oil wealth has been used by the most restrictive, oppressive states to export a regressive, ferociously intolerant and anti-Western form of Islam to mosques and madrassas abroad, from the immigrant quarters of London to the back-country of Indonesia. When we noticed anything at all, we dismissed it as no more than an annoyance, our attitude drifting between the Pollyanna notion that everyone is entitled to his or her own form of religion (no matter if it preaches hatred and praises mass murder) and the “serious” policymaker’s view that religion is a tertiary issue, far less instructive and meaningful than GDP numbers or arms deals.

#### Causes more casualties- turns their instrumentality args- their aff enables terrorists to homogenize all life- even if we pick and choose who terrorist are it’os key to prevent mass casualties

Zimmerman 09

(Peter D., Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Fall 2009, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publications/datr4/01PeterZimmerman.pdf>) /wyo-mm

Mueller discounts the consequences of an improvised nuclear device in odd ways. He suggests that a one kiloton ground burst in New York’s Central Park would barely damage the buildings on the boundaries of the park. That is true, but the same bomb detonated a kilometer or two away could kill tens of thousands or even one hundred thousand people. If the explosion took place in the financial business district of London or New York – or Paris or Singapore – in the middle of the working day, there could be several hundred thousand dead or wounded from the immediate effects. And the fallout from any of these explosions, even the one in Central Park, would kill many tens of thousands more. And Mueller decries the statement that such a bomb could “destroy” a major city; he points out that only a small fraction of the city would be destroyed, just as only a fairly small part of Hiroshima died from a larger bomb. I find myself horrified at the effects of even a very small nuclear explosion in a city. Perhaps that is because I have worked at the Nevada Test Site and walked the terrain where, fifty years ago, the United States tested atomic bombs against real buildings, homes such as those Americans live in and cars such as those we drove then. The important fact to face is that – despite the nuclear Pollyannas who argue that the construction of an improvised nuclear device is too difficult for even a well-financed terrorist, that obtaining sufficient fissile materials is nearly impossible, that the theft of an intact weapon is not going to happen (any longer), and that we may safely relegate nuclear terrorists to the fantasies of nuclear alarmists and the subjects of bad television and movies – the probability of a nuclear terrorist attack in any given year remains significant. Whether the probability is 20 percent, 5 percent, or even as low as one percent, the consequences of an incident are enormous. Significant investment to deter, prevent, detect, and destroy a nuclear terror plot is required. So is investment and research into ways to mitigate the effects of an attack, should all of our defenses fail and a nuclear detonation occur in one of the great cities of the world.

### AT: Defense

#### Yes Nuke terror—their defense is wrong on every level

Zimmerman 09

(Peter D., Department of War Studies, King’s College London, “Do We Really Need to Worry? Some Reflections on the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Fall 2009, <http://www.coedat.nato.int/publications/datr4/01PeterZimmerman.pdf>) /wyo-mm

Mueller chooses another set of criteria by which to judge the plausibility of improvised nuclear devices. He writes down twenty “tasks” in what he calls “the most likely scenario”11 However, this is far too simplistic. He then posits that there is a 50-50 chance of success for each of these “tasks” and that taken together, this means that the odds of success are 1 in 1,048,576. This is truly a small number, and if taken seriously would probably mean that no further significant attention need be paid to nuclear terror scenarios. It is true that if one raises 0.5 to the 20th power, the resulting value is quite small, less than one in a million as desired. The question, however, is not if the value for 0.520 is small; of course it is. But does it bear any relationship to the problem at hand? How did Mueller come to the number twenty for his list of tasks? Some of the items are even compound tasks, one following another, so there could be more than twenty, and by Mueller’s reasoning a still smaller chance of success. Some of them are not tasks proper, but conditions to satisfy (“There must be no inadvertent leaks”. “No locals must sense that something out of the ordinary is going on”.) Still others seem like padding to reach the number 20 (“A detonation team must transport the IND to the target place and set it off… and the untested and much-traveled IND must not prove to be a dud”.). Since Mueller asserts that the probability of a nuclear terrorist starting a project and succeeding is less than one in a million, it is worth noting that 220 is almost exactly 1,000,000 and that 0.520 is, therefore, one in a million. That seems to be the totality of the logic behind the “twenty hurdles” of the Mueller papers and book. There seems to be no analysis to show that 50-50 are appropriate odds for the success of each step, and it is manifestly clear that the twenty hurdles are not statistically independent. Nevertheless, it would seem that twenty hurdles is the smallest plausible number that can provide the one chance in a million which allows Mueller to suggest that those who believe in nuclear terrorism might, with equal logic, believe “in the tooth fairy”.12 In any event, the odds of success for some tasks are nearly 100 percent. For example, it is not difficult to put an IND in a white van and drive it from Montana to Minneapolis, or from outside Boise to inside Boston, so long as the drivers break no traffic laws. I give that task a 90-plus percent probability. Assembling a team of scientists and technicians is likely to be far easier than Mueller supposes. The Manhattan Project was the most exciting, and indeed glamorous, scientific project of the first half of the twentieth century, led by a constellation of great scientists. Many physicists, even today, fantasize about following in their footsteps.13 I give this one an 85-95 percent chance, at least. 14 In any event, Mueller makes elementary mistakes in risk analysis at the conceptual level: He decides on a path to the goal of a nuclear device, and then decides that it is either the only, or the easiest, or the most favorable route. Along the way his analysis is flawed. Mueller suggests that smugglers would be more likely than not to turn in the nuclear gang to the authorities. But as Matt Bunn of Harvard has pointed out14, Al Qaeda and Mexican drug lords routinely manage to move sensitive materials and people across borders, even those of highly developed countries such as the United States. Successful smugglers-for-hire generally do not betray their customers; the penalties for betrayal probably range from a severe beating to barbaric torture followed by a gruesome death. In his articles and presentations on the probability of terrorist use of nuclear weapons, Prof. Mueller frequently lashes out at those who refuse to set the likelihood of such acts at 1 in a million, or less. We are “alarmists”. And we are “imaginative”.15 According to Mueller, my colleague, Jeffrey Lewis, and I indulge in “worst case fantasies”.16 Mueller seems never to have talked with anybody who actually built a nuclear weapon, for his understanding of the components of a simple device makes it seem far more complex than it is. Nor can I share the results of my conversations with weaponeers except to say that they do not consider the construction of certain kinds of nuclear weapons to be beyond the skills of the kind of 20-person group Lewis and I envisioned. Lewis and I carefully assessed the budget for a nuclear terrorist, and arrived at a figure of $10 million. Mueller waves our extensive effort away with the comment that $10 million isn’t enough to corrupt three people. He must live in an expensive district for political bribery. Lewis and I estimated a budget more like a couple of million for actually building the device, including salaries and the procurement of all necessary non-nuclear components and equipment. We do not believe that recruiting the technical staff will require any bribery or corruption. Mueller assumed that he has found the shortest critical path to an improvised nuclear device. He also seems to assume that his list of tasks is so general that it includes all possible critical paths. He’s clearly wrong on the first count, but even if he is right on the second – and I think he is wildly wrong – his compilation is so general that it offers no guidance to law enforcement or the terrorists except to hope for or to guard against betrayals.

### Link

#### Drones reduce terrorism- 5 Warrants

Johnston and Sarbahi ‘13

[Patrick Johnson Former Fellow Harvard’s Kennedy School; Anoop K. Sarbahi Postdoctoral Scholar Stanford, “The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Afghanistan”, 7/1/13, [http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf,//wyo](http://patrickjohnston.info/materials/drones.pdf%2C//wyo) TL]

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we examine five different measures of militant violence: ¶ the frequency of attacks, the lethality of attacks, the number of IED attacks, the¶ number of suicide attacks, and the number of attacks on tribal elders. The results do not¶ support Hypothesis 1—that drone strikes are associated with increased terrorism. On the¶ contrary, they support our hypothesis, (Hypothesis 2), that that drone strikes are¶ associated with decreases in militant violence. We find no evidence in support of the¶ competing hypothesis (Hypothesis 1)—that drone strikes increase violence. We discuss these results in more detail below.

The 2FESL estimates in column 2 of table 2 show that drone strikes are associated¶ with a decrease in militant attacks of approximately 24 percentage points—a result that¶ is statistically significant at the one percent level. From 2007 through 2011, the average¶ agency suffered roughly 0.88 militant attacks per week. During weeks in which a drone¶ strike occurred, agencies suffered an average of about 0.68 attacks

Given that drone strikes are associated with reductions in insurgent attacks in the¶ areas where they occur, it makes sense that drone strikes might also be negatively¶ associated with the lethality, or “quality,” of attacks in those same areas. Consistent with¶ Hypothesis 2, the estimates presented in column 2 of table 2 suggest that the lethality of¶ militant attacks declines by more than 36.5 percent as a result of a drone strike in a given¶ week. On average, 2.77 people were killed or injured in militant attacks in FATA between¶ 2007 and the end of the third quarter of 2011. This figure would decline substantially to¶ 1.76 per week as a result of a single drone strike if the number of drone strikes would¶ increase by one per agency-week.4

Regarding suicide attacks, the coefficient in column 4 of table 2 suggests that drone¶ strikes are also associated with reductions in these tactics. This result is significant at the¶ one percent level. Suicide attacks are relatively rare but extremely high-profile events:¶ the mean number of suicide attacks per agency per week is 0.02, or about one per¶ agency every year. The point estimate appears small, but the marginal effect translates into an almost 67 percent decline in the number of suicide attacks in a week with one drone¶ strike. Thus, the average number of weekly suicide attacks in FATA, which is 0.14 per¶ week during the period under consideration, would decline to 0.05 per week as a result of¶ one drone strike per agency-week. On balance, the evidence is clearly consistent with¶ Hypothesis 2—the “disruption” hypothesis—and not with the argument that drone strikes¶ trigger increased violence (Hypothesis 1)

#### Second, Drones are the best alternative to neutralize terror

Foust ’12

[Foust, J.. N.p.. Web. 31 Jul 2013. a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/targeted-killing-pro-and-con-what-to-make-of-us-drone-strikes-in-pakistan/262862/.]

In the short run, there aren't better choices than drones. The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks. And given the Pakistani government's reluctance either to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force (right now it has neither), there is no writ of the state to impose order and establish the rule of law.

Drones represent the choice with the smallest set of drawbacks and adverse consequences. Reports like Living Under Drones highlight the need for both more transparency from the US and Pakistani governments, and for drawing attention to the social backlash against their use in Pakistan. But they do not definitively build a case against drones in general. Without a better alternative, drones are here to stay.

#### Third, Drones disrupt terrorist leadership planning and execution of plots – unpredictability and anticipation hinders terrorist effectiveness

Anderson, 13

Kenneth Anderson, professor of international law at American University and a member of the Task Force on National Security and Law at the Hoover Institution, “The Case for Drones,” Commentary, June 2013.

Drone warfare today is integrated with a much larger strategic counterterrorism target—one in which, as in Afghanistan in the late 1990s, radical Islamist groups seize governance of whole populations and territories and provide not only safe haven, but also an honored central role to transnational terrorist groups. This is what current conflicts in Yemen and Mali threaten, in counterterrorism terms, and why the United States, along with France and even the UN, has moved to intervene militarily. Drone warfare is just one element of overall strategy, but it has a clear utility in disrupting terrorist leadership. It makes the planning and execution of complex plots difficult if only because it is hard to plan for years down the road if you have some reason to think you will be struck down by a drone but have no idea when. The unpredictability and terrifying anticipation of sudden attack, which terrorists have acknowledged in communications, have a significant impact on planning and organizational effectiveness.

#### We are winning the War on Terror Now

Dreyfuss 13

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The headline in today’s New York Times had to be read twice to make sure that’s what it really said: “Blasts End A Decade of Terrorism on the Wane.” Yes. On the wane. You probably didn’t know that over the past ten years there has been very little significant terrorism in the United States. As I've written repeatedly, terrorism today—here at home, not in, say, Iraq—is just a nuisance, nothing more. In 2004, John Kerry, running for president, said that the then-infinite War on Terror would be won when terrorism was reduced to the status of being a deadly nuisance rather an a constant crisis. By 2004, of course, it already was. The Times, in its lede, says this: The bombing of the Boston Marathon on Monday was the end of more than a decade in which the United States experienced strikingly few terrorist attacks, in part because of the far more aggressive law enforcement tactics that arose after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Well. It adds: In fact, the Sept. 11 attacks were an anomaly in an overall gradual decline in the number of terrorist attacks since the 1970s, according to the Global Terrorism Database, one of the most authoritative sources of terrorism statistics, which is maintained by a consortium of researchers and based at the University of Maryland. The worst decade for terrorism in the United States? The 1970s. The horrible bombings in Boston killed more people, three, than any incident of terrorism except 9/11, the 1993 World Trade Center attack, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and “the poisoning of restaurant salad bars with salmonella bacteria by religious cultists in Oregon in 1984.” The paper quotes Gary LaFree, the researcher who helps compile the date base, thus: I think people are actually surprised when they learn that there’s been a steady decline in terrorist attacks in the U.S. since 1970. And it adds this stunner from LaFree: He said there were about 40 percent more attacks in the United States in the decade before Sept. 11 than in the decade after.

### Terror Real

#### Predictions of terrorism are true- their critique replicates the logic preceding the attacks on Britain

**Jones ‘6** (The commentariat and discourse failure: language and atrocity in Cool Britannia International Aff airs 82: 6 (2006) 1077–1100 © 2006 The Author(s). Journal Compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd/The Royal Institute of International Aff airs DAVID MARTIN JONES AND M. L. R. SMITH )

Rather than accept the existence of a clear and present Islamist threat to western secularism and democracy after the 9/11 attacks, such critical thinking moved the discursive goal posts. **Critical thinkers and opinionators argued instead that western governments deliberately exaggerated the threat** to curtail legitimate dissent and civil liberties.46 In his bestselling book Dude, Where’s My Country? Michael Moore popularized this view, maintaining: ‘There is no terrorist threat. Why has our government gone to such absurd lengths to convince us our lives are in danger? The answer is nothing short of their feverish desire to rule the world, fi rst by controlling us, and then, in turn, getting us to support their eff orts to dominate the rest of the planet.’47 More measured academic commentary termed the propensity of liberal democratic governments to exaggerate the terrorist threat the ‘politics of fear’. Governments, they maintained, conjured the spectre of Islam and catastrophic terror attacks for illiberal purposes. The politics of fear persuaded the gullible masses to accept an illegitimate extension of state power under the rubric of counterterror policy. These measures eroded personal freedoms and restricted civil liberty. The UK government proposals to introduce identity cards, extend detention of terrorist suspects without trial and curtail expression of views calculated to infl ame racial hatred crystallized the new authoritarianism. The politics of fear also facilitated a contentious foreign policy legitimating the 2003 invasion of Iraq, on the grounds of necessary pre-emptive military action against all potential sources of threat and instability.48 Critics thus maintained that ‘Islamist terror’ constituted an all-purpose political bogeyman. Media commentary reinforced the politics of fear hypothesis. ‘So, a climate of fear it is,’ declared Jackie Ashley in the Guardian in March 2004: ‘Everywhere you turn, there is another gray-faced public fi gure telling you that a major terrorist attack is coming … and there is nothing we can do except trust our leaders.’49 In a similar, but academic, vein, security analyst Bill Durodié declared that ‘Insecurity is the key driving concept of our times. Politicians have packaged themselves as risk managers’ in order to pacify ‘a demand from below for protection’.50 The BBC series The Power of Nightmares, screened in the United Kingdom in early 2005, encapsulated this critical understanding for a wider audience.51 Advertising the series, the BBC News website in April 2005 announced: ‘The Power of Nightmares explores how the idea that we are threatened by a hidden and organized network is an illusion. It is a myth that has spread unquestioned through politics, the security services and the international media.’ Pre-publicity presented the threat as a ‘fantasy’ which ‘politicians then found restored their power and authority in a disillusioned age’, and argued somewhat mysteriously: ‘Those with the darkest fears became the most powerful.’52 If before 7/7 the politics of fear increasingly influenced mainstream media commentary, it also dominated UK and US campuses. The Guardian, sampling informed opinion prior to the screening of The Power of Nightmares, confi rmed the orthodoxy that the security bureaucracy and politicians constructed terrorism in order to pursue the politics of fear and repression.53 Adam Roberts, Professor of International Relations at Oxford University, observed that for governments the terror threat is of ‘absolute cosmic signifi cance’, legitimating an ‘anything goes’ attitude towards its defeat. For the historian Linda Colley, ‘States and their rulers expect to monopolise violence, and that is why they react so violently to terrorism.’ Given that there had been only one attack in Europe since 9/11, in Madrid in March 2003, Bill Durodié contended that the ‘reality [of the Al-Qaeda threat to the west] has been essentially a one-off ’.54 Nor was the evolving consensus confi ned to academic and media comment. Such views found support both among members of parliament and from common lawyers. In January 2005 Charles Kennedy, the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Britain’s third largest political party, asserted in his ‘New Year message’: A clear division is emerging in British politics: the politics of fear versus the politics of hope. Labour is counting on the politics of fear, ratcheting up talk of threat, crime and insecurity, while the Conservatives are re-working their populist scares about asylum and the European ‘menace’. Look at how Labour, with the support of the Conservatives, has undermined trust in the political process by its spin and reliance on external threats.55 Suspicion of a government policy based on the politics of fear similarly infl uenced legal decisions with respect to deportation or extradition orders for suspects wanted in third countries for terror-related off ences.56 More particularly, the law lords questioned the government’s authority to detain without trial non-British terror suspects resident in the UK, like Abu Qatada. In December 2004, the highest appellate court found Qatada’s detention illegal. One of the law lords, Lord Bingham, maintained that the government’s powers of detention ‘discriminate on the ground of nationality or immigration status’,57 while Lord Hoff man found that ‘The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these.’58 Those who criticized the government for its political exploitation of the threat, however, failed to recognize that their rejection of the politics of fear was also politically motivated. For the politics of fear itself resulted in highly politicized threat assessments couched in the language of balance, neutrality and concern for an abstract standard of law that transcended short-term political contingencies. Thus, in his judgment on the detention of non-UK citizens, Lord Hoff man argued that ‘fanatical groups’ ‘do not threaten the life of the nation’. He continued: ‘Terrorist crime, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.’59 Hoff man asserted as constitutional fact what could only be an expression of faith. In an analogous vein, the security analyst Bill Durodié discounted the pretensions of Islamism’s UK franchise. After the conviction of the Algerian Kamel Bourgass in 2005 for murder and conspiracy to commit a public nuisance using poisons and explosives, including ricin, Durodié dismissed Al-Qaeda as a ‘conspiracy of dunces’. Assessing the ‘sheer naivety and incompetence of all these so-called al- Qaeda operatives’ like Bourgass, Richard Reid, the ‘dim-witted shoe bomber who had trouble with matches’, and Sajid Badat, ‘the Gloucester loner who bottled out of emulating Reid’, Durodié asserted: ‘If that is the best of what the supposed massed ranks of al-Qaeda have to off er after three years [i.e. after 9/11] … we should have little to fear. But the media, politicians and the police have sought to portray the situation diff erently.’60 **The London bombs disproved the politics of fear hypothesis and exposed the evaluations of law lords like Hoff man and security analysts like Durodié. The facts, expressed in the toll of civilian lives, demonstrated that the government’s perception had been more acute than that of its critics.** But its detractors portrayed government attempts to counter the threat of terror and heighten the state of public vigilance as an insidious plot to undermine democratic values.**61 As Frank Furedi observed, those who believed in the politics of fear met one conspiratorial claim—that the government was using the threat of Islamic terror to weaken basic freedoms—with a counterconspiracy—that there wasn’t much of a threat to begin** **with**.62 **Hence, the politics of fear determined its own preferred policy response, namely, the practice of complacency. Rather than engaging in a debate about the proportionality of response to a home-grown threat of Islamist terror, those who detected the politics of fear lurking behind every government pronouncement instead presented the security predicament in the very reductionist terms of which they accused those who claimed to be exaggerating the threat**. **In other words, the proponents of the politics of fear played the politics of fear themselves.63** Indeed, the thesis required fear—in this case, fear of a creeping authoritarian dystopia—to sustain it. In this way, a reasonable public policy concern about counterterrorist measures eroding established legal rights rapidly degenerated into a one-dimensional caricature of government policy not far removed from paranoid post-9/11 movies like V for Vendetta (2006). Furthermore, the wider commentariat’s acceptance of the politics of fear had far from trivial consequences. Mainstream politicians, the liberal press, television, academics and the courts gave it wide currency as a more objective response to the post-9/11 environment. Its premise, fear, discounted the threat and denigrated any serious attempt to evaluate the actual character and extent of the problem, asserting, without empirical basis, its more insightful assessment of the situation. Lord Walker, the single dissenting law lord in the 8 to 1 judgment in favour of Qatada in December 2004, expressed the inherent danger contained in this politics of complacency, well before the 7/7 attacks. Walker found that It is certainly not the court’s function to substitute for the British Government’s assessment any other assessment of what might be the most prudent or most expedient policy to combat terrorism. When a state is struggling against a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, it would be rendered defenceless if it were required to accomplish everything at once, to furnish from the outset each of its chosen means of action with each of the safeguards.64 The politics of complacency, by contrast, denied the existence of a ‘public emergency’. To the extent that a threat existed, it was attributed largely to government exploitation and overreaction, which had constructed a Muslim out-group.65 Consequently, for the West, the Islamist threat was an ‘enemy of its own making’.66 The rhetoric in response to both the 7/7 attacks and the subsequent revelation of plots and conspiracies in London refl ects a strategic misunderstanding that confuses limited tactical ability with limited political goals. The semantic laxity that informed discussion of the terrorist threat reinforced this misconception. Terrorism is a tactic practised as part of a strategy in war, but it is not a material phenomenon in itself. **The lax terminology and distorted meanings attached to the phenomenon created the epistemological foundations of discourse failure.** This failure enabled Islamist extremists to exploit the fault-lines in liberal, multicultural societies like Britain, which tolerated or ignored their evolving global campaign to engineer an apocalyptic confrontation with secular modernity. Prior to July 2005, the British authorities recognized only one theatre of the ‘war against terrorism’, which required confronting the Islamist threat externally. Yet since 9/11 Al-Qaeda has rapidly mutated, evolving **via the Internet a largely home-grown jihadist strategy to infi ltrate and attack the cosmopolitan western cityscape. A coherent response therefore demands the pursuit of a far more vigorous strategy at home**. In particular, it requires abandoning the prevailing view that the domestic threat is best prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy. **It demands instead a total strategy to deal with a totalizing threat**. **This means recognizing that there is an existential threat,** unencumbered by the politics of fear, root causes and denial that for too long has impeded its eff ective prosecution. An adequate strategy requires, moreover, a multifaceted response that goes beyond law enforcement. This does not mean imposing arbitrary regimes of detention without trial. What it does require, however, is enhanced means of intelligence-gathering, both technical and human, together with a coherent set of government policies addressing education, welfare, asylum, immigration and culture in order to safeguard a sustainable civil association. The **evidence demonstrates the existence of a physical threat, not merely the political fear of a threat**. The implementation of a coherent set of social policies confronting the threat at home recognizes that securing state borders and maintaining internal stability is the fi rst task of responsible government, responsible media and a responsible public education sector, both secondary and tertiary. For **without the basis of security, necessarily premised upon the inculcation of a shared political culture, the conditions for political pluralism and liberal democracy gradually disappear**. This requires a return to the Hobbesian verities of sovereignty, which, despite the illusion of post-Cold War cosmopolitan multiculturalism and the elitist dream of a post-national constellation, represents the only secure basis for liberal democratic order.

### at: critical terrorism studies

#### Their argument essentializes terror scholarship – it’s not a monolithic entity – defer to specific research

**Boyle '8**

Michael J., School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, and John Horgan, International Center for the Study of Terrorism, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University, April 2008, “A Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” Critical Studies On Terrorism, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 51-64

Some CTS advocates have positioned the CTS project against something usually called ‘terrorism studies’, ‘Orthodox terrorism studies’ or, alternatively, ‘terrorology’. Whatever these bodies of literature are (or at least are imagined by those who have created them as such), they are recent intellectual constructions, the product of an over-generalization that has emerged from the identification of (1) the limitations associated with terrorism research to date, coupled with (2) a less than complete understanding of the nature of research on terrorism. A cursory review of the terrorism literature reveals that attempts to generalize about something called Orthodox Terrorism Studies are deeply problematic. Among terrorism scholars, there are wide disagreements about, among others, the definition of terrorism, the causes of terrorism, the role and value of the concept of ‘radicalization’ and ‘extremism’, the role of state terror, the role that foreign policy plays in motivating or facilitating terrorism, the ethics of terrorism, and the proper way to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’. A cursory examination of the contents of the two most well-known terrorism journals Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism quickly reveals this. These differences, and the concomitant disagreements that result in the literature, cut across disciplines – principally political science and psychology, but also others, such as anthropology, sociology, theology, and philosophy – and even within disciplines wide disagreements about methods (for example, discourse analysis, rational choice, among others) persist. To suggest that they can be lumped together as something called ‘terrorology’ or ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ belies a narrow reading of the literature. This is, in short, a ‘straw man’ which helps position CTS in the field but is not based on a well-grounded critique of the current research on terrorism.

#### Terrorism studies are epistemologically and methodologically valid---our authors are self-reflexive

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 Jackson (2007c) calls for the development of an explicitly CTS on the basis of what he argues preceded it, dubbed ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’. The latter, he suggests, is characterized by: (1) its poor methods and theories, (2) its state centricity, (3) its problemsolving orientation, and (4) its institutional and intellectual links to state security projects. Jackson argues that the major defining characteristic of CTS, on the other hand, should be ‘a skeptical attitude towards accepted terrorism “knowledge”’. An implicit presumption from this is that terrorism scholars have laboured for all of these years without being aware that their area of study has an implicit bias, as well as definitional and methodological problems. In fact, terrorism scholars are not only well aware of these problems, but also have provided their own searching critiques of the field at various points during the last few decades (e.g. Silke 1996, Crenshaw 1998, Gordon 1999, Horgan 2005, esp. ch. 2, ‘Understanding Terrorism’). Some of those scholars most associated with the critique of empiricism implied in ‘Orthodox Terrorism Studies’ have also engaged in deeply critical examinations of the nature of sources, methods, and data in the study of terrorism. For example, Jackson (2007a) regularly cites the handbook produced by Schmid and Jongman (1988) to support his claims that theoretical progress has been limited. But this fact was well recognized by the authors; indeed, in the introduction of the second edition they point out that they have not revised their chapter on theories of terrorism from the first edition, because the failure to address persistent conceptual and data problems has undermined progress in the field. The point of their handbook was to sharpen and make more comprehensive the result of research on terrorism, not to glide over its methodological and definitional failings (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xiv). Similarly, Silke’s (2004) volume on the state of the field of terrorism research performed a similar function, highlighting the shortcomings of the field, in particular the lack of rigorous primary data collection. A non-reflective community of scholars does not produce such scathing indictments of its own work.

#### Nuke terror causes extinction---equivalent to full-scale nuclear war

Toon 7

Owen B., chair of the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at CU-Boulder, et al., April 19, 2007, “Atmospheric effects and societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” online: http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed nuclear explosives of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range can produce urban fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and casualties exceeding one million. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would most likely have severe national and international economic consequences. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and terrorists would be most likely to strike there. Accordingly, an organized attack on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, could generate casualties comparable to those once predicted for a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict. Remarkably, the estimated quantities of smoke generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives could lead to significant global climate perturbations (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

#### Turns the case --- successful nuclear terror attack causes way worse crackdowns than drones

Ignatieff 4

[Michael, former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, former Professor in Human Rights Policy at the University of Toronto and a senior fellow of the university's Munk Centre for International Studies; “Could We Lose the War on Terror? Lesser Evils,” New York Times Magazine, 5/02]

Consider the consequences of a second major attack on the mainland United States -- the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, melancholy, anger and fear would hang over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of possibility. The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the materiel required is available for the right price. Democracies live by free markets, but a free market in everything -- enriched uranium, ricin, anthrax -- will mean the death of democracy. Armageddon is being privatized, and unless we shut down these markets, doomsday will be for sale. Sept. 11, for all its horror, was a conventional attack. We have the best of reasons to fear the fire next time. A democracy can allow its leaders one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11 looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not forgive a second one. A succession of large - scale attacks would pull at the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert , with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime friends. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples. Alarmist? Consider where we stand after two years of a war on terror. We are told that Al Qaeda's top leadership has been decimated by detention and assassination. True enough, but as recently as last month bin Laden was still sending the Europeans quaint invitations to surrender. Even if Al Qaeda no longer has command and control of its terrorist network, that may not hinder its cause. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or advice. These cells have given us Madrid. Before that, they gave us Istanbul, and before that, Bali. There is no shortage of safe places in which they can grow. Where terrorists need covert support, there are Muslim communities, in the diasporas of Europe and North America, that will turn a blind eye to their presence. If they need raw recruits, the Arab rage that makes for martyrs is still incandescent. Palestine is in a state of permanent insurrection. Iraq is in a state of barely subdued civil war. Some of the Bush administration's policies, like telling Ariel Sharon he can keep settlements on the West Bank, may only be fanning the flames. So anyone who says "Relax, more people are killed in road accidents than are killed in terrorist attacks" is playing games. The conspiracy theorists who claim the government is manufacturing the threat in order to foist secret government upon us ought to wise up. Anyone who doesn't take seriously a second major attack on the United States just isn't being serious. In the Spanish elections in March, we may have had a portent of what's ahead: a terrorist gang trying to intimidate voters into altering the result of a democratic election. We can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November. Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said in a recent television interview that the Bush administration is concerned that terrorists will see the approaching presidential election as "too good to pass up." Thinking the worst is not defeatist. It is the best way to avoid defeat. Nor is it defeatist to concede that terror can never be entirely vanquished. Terrorists will continue to threaten democratic politics wherever oppressed or marginalized groups believe their cause justifies violence. But we can certainly deny them victory. We can continue to live without fear inside free institutions. To do so, however, we need to change the way we think, to step outside the confines of our cozy conservative and liberal boxes.